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Why Party Democrats Need Popular
Democracy and Popular Democrats Need
Parties
Ethan J. Leib & Christopher S. Elmendorf*
Too often, popular political power-whether it is in the form of
direct democracy or other more innovative forays in participatory or
deliberative democracy-presents itself principally as a counter-
weight to the political power parties wield. Yet setting up "popular
democracy" and '"party democracy" in opposition to one another in
the American political landscape is not only unnecessary but also
pathological: this oppositional posture risks the ossification of party
democracy and keeps popular democrats insulated from the
substantial improvements the power of parties could bring to the
polity. This Article, accordingly, seeks to enrich both party
democracy and popular democracy by showing how each might draw
strengths from the other, and how each needs the other to function
more effectively. A new literature in political theory explores the
central role of partisanship in democratic functioning, and we will
deploy that theory in service of some practical applications in
institutional design here. We have been involved-on the ground
level-in two recent policy conversations that really would have been
improved with a complementary vision of the parties and the people.
We could have better exercises of party democracy and popular
democracy, if only we started to see how they might be brought into
pragmatic symbiosis.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the standard story, popular democracy is fundamentally at
odds with party-based representative democracy. Supporters of popular
political power support initiatives, referenda, and more innovative forays in
participatory democracy as counterweights to the power of political parties.
California's Proposition 13 and various term limits initiatives, to take just a few
examples, have been justified as efforts by the people to retake power from the
unresponsive two-party system. In response, popular democracy's detractors
point to the debates over marriage equality and the ravages of ballot-box
budgeting as reasons to shield civil rights from popular decision making and to
provide political representatives with the latitude they need to govern
effectively. Both camps-and most observers-think of the two systems as
sworn enemies battling for advantage in a zero-sum game.
Yet setting up "popular democracy" and "party democracy" in opposition
to one another in the American political landscape is not only unnecessary but
also pathological: it thwarts an understanding of their potential for mutual
enrichment. We argue here, instead, that popular democracy and party
democracy can and should be viewed as complementary helpmates, each with
the potential to aid the other in overcoming its greatest weaknesses.
Popular democracy and party democracy in the United States each have
characteristic, reasonably well-understood limitations. Ballot initiatives and
[Vol. 100:69
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referenda present a daunting informational challenge for ordinary voters. Even
in its more selective, deliberative forms, popular democracy gives rise to
unanswered questions about agenda setting and legitimacy: only small numbers
of citizens participate, and what they discuss and which options they consider
are generally decided by elites.' To be sure, the popular vote to adopt a ballot
measure can legitimate it as a formal matter, but it is equally clear that a
democratic mandate requires more than such formal legitimacy if most citizens
2are to accept it over time.
Defenders of party democracy-and especially the two-party system-
have long presented it as a solution to democracy's information and
legitimation problems. 3 This assertion presupposes, however, that the two
major parties will campaign and govern on the basis of fairly centrist platforms
with roughly equal appeal to the median voter, that the parties will take turns in
power, and that the mass electorate will discern which party is responsible for
what and mete out electoral rewards and punishment accordingly.4 Party
democracy as practiced in the United States, however, does not consistently
satisfy these conditions.5  Indeed, state constitutional provisions for
supermajority voting rules, plural executives, and separated powers can be said
to manifest a deep suspicion of the claims of party purists.
Our claim in this Article is that parties and partisanship can help to
ameliorate the informational, agenda-setting, and legitimation problems of
popular democracy, and that popular democracy has unexplored potential for
righting a poorly functioning system of party democracy. Notwithstanding the
conventional narrative of opposition, there is an important potential for
complementarity between popular and party democracy. 6
1. Here we have in mind exercises like the British Columbia Citizens Assembly on Electoral
Reform in which a deliberative body of lay citizens, often chosen at random, is convened to decide or
advise on some pressing matter of public concern. CITIZENS' ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM,
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
2. The citizens on the losing side of any election are at risk of becoming disaffected from the
political order. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON ET AL., LOSERS' CONSENT: ELECTIONS AND
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY (2005).
3. See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES
AND PARTISANSHIP (2008); Russell Muirhead, A Defense of Party Spirit, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 713
(2006); Jonathan White & Lea Ypi, Rethinking the Modern Prince: Partisanship and the Democratic
Ethos, 58 POL. STuD. 809 (2010).
4. The standard literature on retrospective voting includes V.0. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE
ELECTORATE (1966) and MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL
ELECTIONS (1981). For canonical work on parties' need to appeal to the median voter, see ANTHONY
DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group
Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948); Susan C. Stokes, Political Parties and Democracy, 2
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 243 (1999); and Bernard Grofiman, Downs and Two-Party Convergence, 7 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 25 (2004).
5. This argument is developed at length in Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher,
Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance and Election Law (Oct. 4, 2011) (working paper) (on file with
author).
6. Heather Gerken gestures at this thought in Heather Gerken, Making Democracy Work, 37
20121
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Part I establishes the necessary definitions and then explores the
conventional narrative of the emergence of popular democracy against the
parties, followed by the parties' defensive response thereto. The old story is one
of trying to use popular democracy to destroy the party system; popular
democrats today routinely reveal these Progressive roots. Party leaders then
respond defensively, undermining popular initiatives at the implementation
stage or even using the initiative process to shape partisan competition and
candidate campaigns. The somewhat newer story is one of "productive
tension," where the conflict is acknowledged but refocused to highlight the
good that may serendipitously result from the adversarial posture of popular
and party democracy.7 But the productive-tension story offers only a defense of
"hybrid democracy" in its familiar guises, rather than an account of whether the
conventional hybrid forms can be reworked and improved upon-with the
popular element used to strengthen party-based representation and
accountability and the partisan element given a formal role in popular
lawmaking with an eye to meliorating popular democracy's characteristic
difficulties. That is our project here.
Part II reviews canonical political science literature that teaches what
parties can do to keep a political system responsible, stable, and vital.8 It also
explores new work ih political theory that celebrates the importance of parties
and partisanship to political functioning, both on a system-wide basis as well as
for the ordinary citizen.
We then turn to the potential for complementarity between popular and
party democracy. 9 Part III homes in on some recurring design problems that
polities face concerning party democracy on the one hand and popular
democracy on the other. We posit that popular democracy can help treat the
illnesses endemic to party democracy and vice versa.
POL. THEORY 838 (2009) (reviewing ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUENCY:
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEsIGN (2005) and
KEVIN O'LEARY, SAVING DEMOCRACY: A PLAN FOR REAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA (2006)),
though Gerken is principally focused on "representative democracy" broadly rather than party
democracy specifically, our focus here.
7. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
8. Because there has been much more appreciation, analysis, and criticism of popular
democracy in the legal academy-see, for example, Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made
Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 903 (2006)-we think it is more important to dwell carefully here on
parties' contribution to our democracy. It is a common perspective among political scientists but not
well understood by legal theorists.
9. We are not the first to suggest that it might be good for the polity to have both strong popular
democracy and strong parties. See, e.g., Anthony J. Eksterowicz & Paul C. Cline, Is Citizen
Participation Consistent with Effective Political Parties?, 79 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 529 (1990). But the
theorists who see room for both have not done enough to highlight the ramifications of this reconciled
complementary view for institutional design. Rosenblum herself has few institutional design ideas in
her book and concludes by inviting others to incorporate her theoretical insights into design projects.
See ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 458 ("[Tlhere is a lot to say about how institutional
arrangements... could shape the work parties do, and I have said little about prescriptions."). We
accept her invitation here.
[Vol. 100:69
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The central, related problems of party democracy are (1) sustained
breakdowns in competition, with the major parties failing to compete robustly
for the affections of the polity's median voter on the basis of political
considerations specific to the government in question, and (2) accountability
occlusion, with the mass electorate unable to discern which party is responsible
for what and to respond accordingly at the polls. The first problem often occurs
at subnational levels in federal democracies.10 The second problem may also
result from federal arrangements, owing to voter confusion about the
distribution of governmental powers across levels or the causes of the social
and economic conditions the voter observes. More important for present
purposes, accountability occlusion can be exacerbated or ameliorated by
structural arrangements internal to a particular government. Separated powers
and supermajoritarian decision rules-both characteristic of state government
in the United States-are causes of accountability occlusion.
Popular democracy, however, offers two promising avenues for
experimentation in an attempt to fix these problems. First, states that currently
require supermajority votes of the legislature on certain matters should consider
letting the majority party opt for a referendum instead of meeting
supermajoritarian constraints. Like legislative supermajority requirements, a
public referendum could limit the majority party's ability to adopt ideologically
extreme policies and to give away the store to special interest groups-both of
which are substantial risks when, owing to competitive breakdown, the
prospect of the majority party losing its majority status is too remote to temper
policymaking. But unlike legislative supermajority requirements, a referendum
call by the majority party would clarify which party bears responsibility for the
policy ultimately adopted.
Second, and closely related to the first, states might empower each major-
party legislative caucus, acting in its own name, to put its top legislative prio-
rity to a direct popular vote (say, one bill per legislative session). This would
focus voters on what each party stands for with respect to the government in
question, which is a prerequisite to effective partisan competition. It would also
give the minority party a meaningful role in governance, 1 helping to legitimate
the system but without the hobbling effects of supermajoritarianism.12
Popular democracy, for its part, is often challenged on grounds of citizen
competence. Parties can be part of the solution. Direct-democracy states could
10. See Elmendorf& Schleicher, supra note 5, at 35-50.
11. Allowing minorities or minority parties to have agenda-setting power to force
accountability is a theme of David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548 (2009);
Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74
(2005); and Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2312 (2006).
12. For a discussion of supermajority rules and their underlying political theory, see generally
Ethan J. Leib, Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141
(2006).
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authorize political party organizations or party caucuses in the legislature to
make ballot-printed "endorsements" in initiative and referendum elections,
enabling voters who would otherwise be in the dark to rely on that most
familiar, useful, and time-tested of voting cues: the political party label.
Political parties can also strengthen popular democracy in its more novel
and deliberative forms, such as citizens' assemblies and policy juries. Parties
could be used to develop policy proposals for the assembly's considerations, to
winnow the field of options for lay citizen bodies to consider, and to resolve
otherwise unanswerable questions about which outside groups are entitled to
the deliberative body's time and attention. In a two-party system, the major
parties possess a striking combination of qualities found nowhere else:
technical policymaking expertise, sensitivity to interest groups, political
acumen, and the allegiance of large swaths of the citizenry. These qualities are
precisely what are needed to organize and ground the policy-oriented
deliberations of a body of lay citizens and to legitimate the inevitable exclusion
of a proposal or interest group.
To drive home the practical importance of our thesis about the potential
complementarity of popular and party democracy, Part III winds up by
applying the thesis to two important contemporary policy debates: state budget
stalemates and state constitutional reform. Both are issues in which we were
personally involved. With regard to budget stalemates, we argued in the New
York Times 13 and the San Francisco Chronicle14 that California and other states
that require legislative supermajorities for the adoption of budgets and/or tax
increases should institute an alternative mechanism whereby each major-party
legislative caucus can propose its own preferred budget directly to the people,
or to a randomly selected subset thereof.'
5
The other example in Part III draws from our work as legal and policy
advisors to Repair California, a coalition that sought a limited constitutional
convention to reform California's constitution. 16 At one time, Repair California
wanted a convention whose delegates would be chosen at random from the
13. Chris Elmendorf & Ethan J. Leib, Budgets by the People, for the People, N.Y. TIMES, July
28,2009, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/opinion/281eib.html.
14. Chris Elmendorf & Ethan J. Leib, Let Californians Vote on Two Budgets-i Red, 1 Blue,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 2011, at A12, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article/article?
f-/c/a/2011/02/10/EDRR1HKUNU.DTL.
15. For an exposition and analysis of participatory budgeting in Brazil-a design that inspires
but is ultimately distinguishable from our proposal--see MARION GRET & YVES SINTOMER, THE
PORTE ALEGRE EXPERIMENT: LEARNING LESSONS FOR BETTER DEMOCRACY (Stephen Wright trans.,
2005).
16. For a brief history of Repair California and its undoing, see Kylie Mendonca, Where's the
Revolution? A Short History of Repair California's Short Promise, BOHEMIAN, May 26, 2010,
http://www.bohemian.com/bohemian/05.26.10/feature-1021.html. For a description of the venture
while it was still in its design phase, see Hendrik Hertzberg, The States We're In, NEW YORKER, Aug.
24, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/08/24/090824taco-talk-hertzberg. With
Repair California's website now removed from the Internet, this Article reports some details that are
no longer widely available.
[Vol. 100:69
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citizenry at large, rather than selected through an appointment or election
process that would likely favor the currently dominant political party and
interest groups. Because constitutions should not entrench momentarily
dominant parties or interest groups, we shared Repair California's preference
for a convention of laypersons. But we also wanted lay citizen delegates to be
advised by members of the party establishment to root their thinking in reality
and with expertise and information that parties are reasonably competent at
providing. We suggested that this could be achieved by establishing an
advisory body composed of political elites, which would set the initial agenda
for the convention and provide ongoing feedback during the delegates'
deliberations. This model is a good example of complementarity in action.
We think starting to see party democracy and popular democracy as
potential sources of mutual improvement rather than as warring opposites is a
big step forward and promises better institutional design. Populists and party
advocates have for generations seen one another as having adverse interests. It
is high time for both to understand what the other offers to the political system
generally and to optimize their own performance by harnessing the virtues of
the other.
I.
THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVE: CONFLICT RATHER THAN
COMPLEMENTARITY
In this Part, we explore the tensions between party democrats and popular
democrats as a matter of intellectual history and theory-as political scientists
have come to see the relevant dynamics between party and popular democracy.
A lengthy intellectual history and complete review of the political science
literature is beyond the scope of this Article,17 but the basic story is one of
conflict. Even the more nuanced accounts of co-option and, more recently,
productive tension, rely on a fundamentally adversarial picture of the two
democratic modalities.
Our working definition of party democracy is drawn from the canonical
account in Giovanni Sartori's Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for
Analysis. Party democracy channels the contest for power principally through
parties, "any political group identified by an official label that presents at
elections, and is capable of placing through elections ... candidates for public
office."' 8 The definition of a party can be refined, as follows:
[A]n organization... [that] is expected to endure beyond the lifespan
of those who bring it into existence,. . . if it competes in elections with
the intention of capturing the major institutions of government,
17. For such an exhaustive treatment, see Nancy Rosenblum's book-ROSENBLUM, supra note
3-about how democracies and democratic theorists have viewed parties through the ages.
18. GIOVANNI SARTORI, PARTIEs AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A FRAMEwORK FOR ANALYSIS 63
(1976).
2012]
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through which ... it intends to exercise power in its own name.' 9
Party democrats turn these definitions into something normative; they hold that
democratic polities should be organized by parties that compete for power and
form governments. This Article primarily addresses two-party systems, the
form that party democracy assumes in the United States and in most other
nations that elect legislative assemblies from single-member districts using
21plurality-winner voting rules.
Our working definition of popular democracy is essentially institutional. It
includes instances of citizens playing a direct role in the lawmaking process, as
they do in initiative and referendum elections and when convened in citizen
juries to advise others or to make political decisions. Popular democrats, seeing
these institutions in a normative light, hold the people to be the source of
sovereignty and think democracy should involve the people directly in law-
making and implementation through institutions other than candidate elections.
A. The Antinomy of the Parties and the People
There is a tradition-most easily traced through the American
Progressives-that pits the parties against the people. Whatever continuing
political resonance Progressives have in the modem U.S. political system,
citizens continue to live with this inheritance. 22 And even if the historiography
of the Progressive movement paints a complicated account of Progressives'
motivations, 23 there are good reasons that their anti-party attitude remains with
us today. Party systems still easily conjure thoughts of bosses, spoils,
patronage, votes-for-sale, and corruption. The Progressives were not the first to
make these associations-politics itself conjures these images for many-but
venality gets systematized as part of the party apparatus in the Progressive
24 2narrative. Progressives' sales pitch against big parties sticks with us.25
Progressives are most often associated with the institution of direct
democracy, routinely discussed as an antidote to the corruptive tendencies of
19. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 466 n.59 (quoting Joseph LaPalombara, Reflections on
Political Parties and Political Development, Four Decades Later, 13 PARTY POL. 141, 143--44
(2007)). We have edited the quotation to avoid LaPalombara's focus on national parties.
20. Bernard Manin takes credit for the term "party democracy." See BERNARD MANIN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 196 n.6, 206-18 (1997). Our use is somewhat
different but not in ways that would be particularly useful to elaborate in this context.
21. See generally MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND
ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN STATE (Barbara North & Robert North trans., 1954).
22. For a history that links the Progressive agenda with our contemporary political
commitments, see ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM (1994).
23. See, e.g., RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986);
Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search ofProgressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 113 (1982).
24. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 172.
25. For more work telling the Progressive tale, see PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY,
LAWMAKING BY INITIATIvE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 2 (1998); RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); V.0. KEY, JR. & WINSTON W. CROUCH, THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA (1939).
[Vol. 100:69
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party democracy and as a higher law that can take power away from parties and
hand it back to the people, where it belongs. More than two-thirds of
26Americans now live in a city or state with the popular initiative. Academic
criticism notwithstanding, the vast majority of citizens are pleased to have this
Progressive institution, which can be used as a counterweight (or as a credible
threat of a counterweight) to a political system tied up with duopolistic
parties.27 The ascendancy of direct democracy is undeniable, 28 and parties
inspire very little confidence within the electorate. 29 Although in Europe and
other countries parties often sponsor ballot questions,30 the American political
system's bifurcation of party democracy and popular democracy is notable and
potentially traceable to the ethos of direct democracy's Progressive ancestry.
It is not without reason that party democrats see direct democracy as a
threat. Referendums and initiatives are often said to "contribut[e] ... greatly to
the relative weakness of political parties,"3 1 at least in part because parties are
less able to engage their "programmatic" and agenda-setting functions when
others get to set the agenda from outside the party system.32 Initiative
26. JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 8 (2004).
27. See generally id Americans' continued enthusiasm for direct democracy is reported and
analyzed in SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING, AND
DIRECT DEMOCRACY (1998); Joshua J. Dyck & Mark Baldassare, Process Preferences and Voting in
Direct Democratic Elections, 73 PUB. OP. Q. 551 (2009); Alana S. Jeydel & Brent S. Steel, Public
Attitudes Toward the Initiative Process in Oregon, 34 STATE & LOCAL GOV'T REV. 173 (2002); Todd
Donovan & Jeffrey A. Karp, Popular Support for Direct Democracy, 12 PARTY POL. 671 (2006).
28. See John G. Matsusaka, The Eclipse of Legislatures: Direct Democracy in the 21st
Century, 124 PUB. CHOICE 157 (2005).
29. See VIRGINIA A. HODGKiNSON & MURRAY WEITZMAN, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN
THE UNITED STATES (1996), available at http://www.cpanda.org/cpanda/analysis/a0O243 (in the
"Browse" box, select "Confidence in political organizations [Q4B_4]" and click "Get results!")
(finding that 40.5 percent of Americans have "very little" confidence in political organizations and
only 4.3 percent have a "a great deal").
30. See generally Ian Budge, Political Parties in Direct Democracy, in REFERENDUM
DEMOCRACY: CITIZENS, ELITES, AND DELIBERATION IN REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS 67, 69 (Matthew
Mendelsohn & Andrew Parkin eds., 2001). The most obvious contrast case to the United States is
Switzerland, which is both a party democracy and a direct democracy; the systems co-exist without the
same sense of tension that is endemic to U.S. conceptions. And in Italy, parties have seemingly been
strengthened by direct democracy. See id. at 69-70.
31. Kris Kobach, Switzerland, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE
OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 132 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994). Indeed, weakening parties
is often remarked upon as a major deficit of direct democracy. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INTmATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 70, 230 (1989); DAVID B.
MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 27,
189-99 (1984); CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 68-69 (1992); David B. Magleby, Direct
Legislation in the United States, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD, supra, at 254-57.
32. See LEON EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 261-88 (1967).
Regarding the effects of direct democracy on issue agendas in legislative elections, see generally
STEPHEN P. NICHOLSON, VOTING THE AGENDA: CANDIDATES, ELECTIONS, AND BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS (2005).
2012]
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campaigns threaten to disrupt intraparty alliances, bring up "wedge issues," and
tear at the fabric of party unity.
33
Perhaps most important, the initiative process threatens what has long
been seen as the greatest strength of two-party democracy: the enabling of
meaningful, socially productive political participation by even minimally
informed voters, who may vote retrospectively (for or against the party in
charge) based on their local observations of social and economic conditions.
The more law that gets made directly, outside of the legislative arena, the less it
makes sense to blame the then-dominant party for conditions one dislikes. Who
is to say whether the bad results were caused by the party in charge or by the
people themselves exercising the initiative power? Extensive use of the ballot
initiative could end up gutting representative government by depriving elected
lawmakers of both the capacity (by tying their hands) and the incentives (by
clouding responsibility) to solve the problems that voters care about.
Modem day experiments with and theories of "deliberative democracy"-
a democratic modality in which the talk of ordinary citizens must contribute to
policy outcomes to legitimize them-routinely invoke Progressivism in their
design discussions, reinforcing the tendency to see party democracy and
popular democracy as oppositional. Deliberative democrats often see their
advocacy for deliberation as necessary in part because of party politics that can
too easily corrupt public discourse.34 Deliberative forums are routinely
33. For this range of arguments-and for a defense of both direct democracy and party
democracy-see generally IAN BUDGE, THE NEW CHALLENGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY (1996).
Parties also can lose their intermediary status on account of direct democracy. See ARTHUR LIPow,
POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY: EXPLORATIONS IN HISTORY AND THEORY (1996); Lloyd N.
Cutler, Political Parties and a Workable Government, in A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT?: THE
CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS 49-58 (Burke Marshall ed., 1987); Samual Issacharoff& Daniel R.
Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999).
34. For our efforts to engage in deliberative democratic design with features of popular and
party democracy in view, see Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through
Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366 (2005); ETHAN J. LEIB,
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
(2004). For the roots of the latter's design proposal in the work of Progressives, see LEIB, supra, at 51-
57; that section draws heavily from KEVIN MATTSON, CREATING A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC: THE
STRUGGLE FOR URBAN PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY DURING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1998) and
focuses attention on Charles Zueblin, Frederic Howe, and Tom Johnson. Rosenblum's charges against
deliberative democrats notwithstanding-see ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 206, 273-311-
Deliberative Democracy in America took parties seriously and made room for them explicitly. See
LEIB, supra, at 50-51 & 73-76. She is right, however, that some deliberative democrats can see parties
as obstructing deliberation rather than framing or mobilizing it. See, e.g., James S. Fishkin, A Nation in
a Room, BOS. REV., Mar./Apr. 2006, at 10. What she is not right about is that the "constant in all
[deliberative democratic literature] is unyielding antipartyism." ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 298. We
think Muirhead has this wrong too. See Muirhead, supra note 3, at 715 ("[D]eliberative ideals
implicitly view party loyalties as impediments to the sort of reflection that deliberation requires."); see
generally Russell Muirhead, Can Deliberative Democracy Be Partisan?, 22 CRITICAL REV. 129, 136
(2010) (arguing "not really"). In a recent paper, White & Ypi are starting to envision a way to break
through Muirhead's claim that "[p]artisan democracy is a fundamental rival to deliberative
democracy." See id. at 130; Jonathan White & Lea Ypi, On Partisan Political Justification, 105 AM.
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idealized as post-partisan affairs: parties do not get seats at the table in the
institutions of popular governance inspired by Progressives.
35
Progressives are also conventionally credited with opening up party
primaries to popular voting.36 The direct primary sought to eradicate but could
only dilute the worry that nominations for major offices only give lay citizens
the opportunity for very limited input. Progressives reasonably complained that
elite party "machines" 37 were presenting nominations to the people as faits
accomplis. Giving citizens a say on whom the party would be proposing for the
general election was, of course, an effort to have the parties and the people
usefully interact (as we will ultimately suggest is a perfectly healthy posture for
popular democracy). Yet more was going on in this reasonable reform than
either simple access to important party decisions or a recognition of something
that cannot be denied: in one-party jurisdictions with no party competition, the
nomination game is the whole ball of wax.38
Two nomoi-that of the party and that of the people-were seen as
fighting for sovereignty, and the Progressives knew whose side they were on.
The direct primary was calculated to weaken the law of parties. 39 In addition to
more access for the people to a party convention, many Progressives imagined
the dissolution of parties-or at least bolting from them as a way to punish and
chasten them.40 Some fantasized about a post-party world, where we are all
POL. SCI. REV. 381 (2011).
We should also be clear that there is a divide within the deliberative democracy literature-which
we paper over here (as Rosenblum also does). Some deliberative democrats really are most interested
in deliberation at the legislative, executive, or judicial level as the touchstone of legitimacy. Those
democrats may also underestimate parties but most deliberative democrats these days fall into what
one of us called the populist strain. See LEIB, supra, at 31-33 (differentiating between the
"elitist/liberal" and the "populist/democratic" strains); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary
Law's Lesson for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249,1254 (2011) (same).
35. But see BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FIsHKN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004) (convening
citizens to deliberate about partisan elections). Although Rosenblum tries to dismiss the book's respect
for party democracy in a variety of ways, we think Ackerman and Fishkin do an admirable job finding
a way to meld party democracy and popular democracy in their Progressive-inspired design.
36. To be fair, not all accept this account of the emergence of the direct primary. For a
challenge to the orthodoxy, see ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY: PARTY
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH (2002) (arguing that party elites
instituted the direct primary to replace caucus convention systems for their own reasons and not to
accommodate antiparty reformers).
37. Even talking about parties as machines is a Progressive inheritance. For a classic from the
period, see JESSE MACY, PARTY ORGANIZATION AND MACHINERY (1904).
38. See Adam Winkler, Voters'Rights and Parties' Wrongs: Early Political Party Regulation
in the State Courts, 1886-1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881-82 (2000).
39. See, e.g., George W. Norris, Why I Believe in the Direct Primary, 16 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 22-24 (1923) (explaining that the direct primary "takes away the power of the party
leader or boss and places responsibility for control upon the individual"); see also AUSTIN RANNEY,
CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION 129 (1975) (arguing that direct primaries weakened parties'
control over their nominating processes).
40. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 191 (citing MICHAEL MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF POPULAR
POLITICS: THE AMERICAN NORTH, 1865-1928 57 (1986) (suggesting that the Progressives called for
"a new Revolutionary War against the party system")).
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"Independents" and no one does their political business with any fealty to
party.41 Parties must be divisive and partial by their very nature. For
Progressives (and many people's Progressive inheritance), independence from
parties is good for the individual citizen and the political system; it can
extricate us "from the narrow and deadly groove of parties, 'A which disable us
from seeing the people as a whole,43 and are seen as the engines of corruption.4
The Progressives were committed to what Hannah Arendt articulated so
well: that popular government must "challenge... the party system as such, in
all its forms." 45 She highlighted that "it is indeed in the very nature of the party
system to replace... government of the people by the people" with
"government of people by an elite sprung from the people.' '46 (Party democrats
in the Schumpeterian tradition would not disagree.47) Like Progressives, she
saw parties as "very efficient instruments through which the power of the
people is curtailed and controlled." 4
This is, to be sure, a narrative that reaches back even further in the history
of political thought. Antipartyism connects to a desire for political "holism," a
deep anxiety about "fatal divisiveness" that will bring down democracy 49 and
the American founders' proclaimed desire to be rid of factions. 50 But its
modern incarnation seems easily pinned to the Progressives and their sway over
our understanding of politics. Even if there is plenty in the historiography of
Progressivism to make us question their commitment to the average citizen,
51
their institutions that are still with us are the cornerstones of popular
41. Except perhaps to the party that is the party of the whole, without partiality. See MOISEI
OSTROGORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 420 (1910).
42. 2 MoISEI OSTROGORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
600 (Frederick Clarke trans., 1964).
43. See OSTROGORSKI, supra note 41, at 161 ("Up to this point not much has been seen of the
people, although it has been talked of a good deal; everybody quoted its authority, acted in its name,
took pledges on its behalf, but this everybody was made up almost exclusively of the class of
professional politicians [in parties].").
44. See, e.g., LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-GOvERNMENT: BEING AN
ATTEMPT TO TRACE AMERICAN POLITICAL CORRUPTION TO ITS SOURCES IN SIX STATES OF THE
UNITED STATES WITH A DEDICATION TO THE CZAR 42 (1906).
45. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTnON 269 (1965).
46. Id. at 281 (citing DUVERGER, supra note 21, at 425).
47. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
48. ARENDT, supra note 45, at 273.
49. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, chs. 1 & 2.
50. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Political Parties and Constitutionalism, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds.,
forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1550905 (acknowledging that more modem
constitutions take a less antiparty view than the American one did). For the standard account of how
the party system was legitimized in the United States, the founders' antipathy notwithstanding, see
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 (1969).
51. It can be argued that, veiled in all the Progressive rhetoric was just another form of elitism,
whose church was the university and whose commitment to "merit" and "civil service" was antiparty
without being pro-populist in the slightest. Id. at 179-83 & 195-99.
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democracy. And those institutions were intended to engrave the tombstones of
party democracy.
Yet big parties are still with us and show no realistic signs of implosion,
notwithstanding Americans' continuing deep suspicion of them. 52 Popular
democracy failed in its grandest ambitions.53 How and why that happened is its
own story, but, for our purposes here, it is important to see that it has led to a
slightly different way to think about the antinomy of the parties and the people.
B. Co-option, Hybrid Democracy, and the Potential for "Productive Tension"
Some Progressives were skeptical that direct democracy and direct
primaries would be enough to counter the party system, thinking that parties
would be able to co-opt and exploit both systems.54 Now that the vast majority
of Americans live in "hybrid democracies" where both parties and popular self-
government rule,55 parties do appear to have adjusted, just as the more wary
Progressives feared that they would.56
Parties have run their own initiative campaigns in the shadows,
endeavoring to shift the ground rules of political competition in the party's
52. See HODGKiNSON & WEITZMAN, supra note 29. And this is not just an American
phenomenon.
53. Parties continue to dominate democracy, and popular democracy has not really changed
that. See Budge, supra note 30, at 80-83.
54. See MARY PARKER FOLLETr, THE NEW STATE: GROUP ORGANIZATION THE SOLUTION OF
POPULAR GOvERNMENT (1920). For a contemporary political science evaluation that the direct
primary "succeeded in multiplying the party oligarchies rather than in democratizing them," see PAUL
ALLEN BECK & FRANK J. SORAUF, PARTY POLITfCS IN AMERICA 251 (7th ed. 1992).
Rosenblum usefully spells out how Follett's insight into the group spawned a "civil society"
literature-and explores how and why parties routinely get left off of the list of civil society groups.
We think Rosenblum tends to overplay the antipartyism in the civil society literature; once parties are
seen as arms of the state, it is harder to see them as organic civil society groups (even though there are,
obviously, lots of interactions between those groups and parties proper). See ROSENBLUM, supra note
3, at 261-73. Parties are not "mere voluntary associations[s] but" can be rightly conceived as "political
organ[s] and as such [perhaps] should be recognized and controlled by law." Alonzo H. Tuttle,
Limitations upon the Power of the Legislature to Control Political Parties and Their Primaries, 1
MICH. L. REV. 466,469 (1903).
55. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, The Promise and Perils of Hybrid Democracy, 59 OK. L.
REv. 277 (2006); Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1096, 1130 (2005);
Elizabeth Garrett, Crypto-Initiatives in Hybrid Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 985 (2005).
56. This counter-narrative might be credited to the Garrett sources above and the following key
works: Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100 COLUM. L. REv. 731
(2000); Daniel A. Smith & Caroline J. Tolbert, The Initiative to Party: Partisanship and Ballot
Initiatives in California, 7 PARTY POL. 739 (2001); ELIZABETH R. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE
INITIATIVE: How STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY (2001). Of course, to say
that the parties "have adapted" is not to deny that direct democracy may weaken political parties.
Indeed, the weakening of parties is often seen as a major deficit of direct democracy. See CRONIN,
supra note 31, at 70, 230; MAGLEBY, supra note 31 at 22, 27, 189-99; Magleby, Direct Legislation in
the United States, supra note 31, at 254-57; CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 31. But see
Linda Maduz, Direct Democracy, 2 LIVING REVS. DEM. 1, 7-8 (2010), available at
http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2010-1 (reviewing European studies indicating that parties,
especially minor parties, are sometimes strengthened by direct democracy).
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favor,57 to raise the salience of issues that favor the party in candidate
campaigns, 58 or to encourage turnout by segments of the electorate that benefit
the party.59 Major parties that invest in broadcasting their support for or
opposition to a ballot initiative can affect the outcome of the election. And the
party in government-public officials elected on the party label-may thwart
initiatives at the back end by withholding funding or other resources necessary
for the full implementation of the initiative.
61
Exploitation and subversion by the parties would seem to frustrate a great
deal of what popular democrats were hoping to accomplish with their
institutional innovations, but a recent modification of the "parties will adapt"
trope puts a more positive spin on the conflict. In a thesis that John Matsusaka
has been promoting, the mere availability of direct democracy within a
jurisdiction can serve to motivate legislators to pursue policies preferred by the
median voter.62 The parties in government, seeing that the median voter can
57. We can name names, if you like. One example that easily comes to mind is the (failed)
drive to change how California allocates its presidential electors in the Electoral College from a
winner-take-all system (which forty-eight states use) to a district-based allocation method (which two
states use). Although this initiative proposal was made to look like it was about "fair" representation of
the voters of California and their presidential preferences (and an effort to encourage candidates for
president to come to California to campaign)--hence, the name of the supporting committees
"Californians for Equal Representation" and then "California Counts!"-it was also supported and
pressed by the California Republican Party (the top donor) and was a fairly transparent attempt to win
electoral votes for the Republican Party in the 2008 presidential race. For some analysis of this
initiative, see Ethan J. Leib & Eli J. Mark, Commentary, Democratic Principle and Electoral College
Reform, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 105 (2008), available at
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/leibmark.pdf.
58. See, e.g., NICHOLSON, supra note 32, at 91-131 (investigating the California Republican
Party's use of immigration and affirmative action ballot initiatives to set agenda in candidate
campaigns).
59. Putting this strategy into effect is obviously tricky, since an initiative likely to mobilize core
supporters of one party may also induce a countermobilization by supporters of the other party. Recent
studies show that mobilization by ballot initiative campaigns is concentrated among conventional
partisan voters. See, e.g., Joshua J. Dyck & Nicholas R. Seabrook, Who is Mobilized by Direct
Democracy? Context, Partisanship, and Turnout in Ballot Initiative Elections (2008) (working paper)
available at http://www.law.buffalo.edu/baldycenter/pdfs/DyckPaper08.pdf; Todd Donovan & Daniel
A. Smith, Turning On and Turning Out: Assessing the Individual-Level Effects of Ballot Measures,
Delivered Before the 4th Annual State Politics and Policy Conference (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
http://bisc.3cdn.net/534979c065caa53507 b7m6b5a7t.pdf. Regarding the effect of high-profile "social
issue" ballot measures on turnout, see Daniel R. Biggers, Social Issue Ballot Measures and Their
Impact on Turnout (2011) (working paper) available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/jcurry/saps/
documents/3_5/biggers.pdf.
60. See generally HANSPETER KRIESI, DIRECT DEMOCRATIC CHOICE: THE SWISS EXPERIENCE
139 (2005) (highlighting that party cues are the "quintessential shortcut" in initiative voting); Sara
Binzer Hobolt, Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in Referendums
on European Integration, 46 EUR. J. POL. RES. 151 (2007) (analyzing effect of party cues in
referendum elections).
61. GERBER ET AL., supra note 56.
62. See generally MATSUSAKA, supra note 26; see also Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative
Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 99 (1996) (same); Simon Hug &
George Tsebelis, Veto Players and Referendums Around the World, 14 J. THEOR. POLIT. 465 (2002)
(extending analysis to multi-dimensional issue space).
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easily overrule them, respond accordingly and anticipatorily, adopting policies
that appeal to that voter. In this retelling of the on-the-ground dynamics of the
tension between party and popular democracy, the conflict results in a
productive dialectic with policy ultimately better tracking the median voter-or
so one might reasonably hope. Further tests of Matsusaka's thesis have yielded
decidedly mixed results.
63
These accounts do complicate the conventional narrative in some ways,
but they are consistent with it in another, for the story is still one of fighting
democratic modalities. 64 Even the more optimistic productive tension thesis
remains insufficiently attentive to the potential for complementarity or mutual
reinforcement between party and popular democracy. Matsusaka's argument is
a way to make peace with popular democracy and notice something useful
about the way it might work even when it appears not to be working. But it is
not the basis of a reform agenda to improve popular or party democracy, which
we think is a reasonable aspiration.
To find the best attunement of popular democracy with parties, we need to
understand what both popular democracy and party democracy are good for.
For our purposes here, we assume legal theorists have at their disposal a pro
and con list for popular democracy; 65 party democracy, by contrast, is a bit
more unfamiliar. Moreover, Americans by and large like their popular
democracy and are much more skeptical of parties. 66 It is, then, to the benefits
of party democracy-too often unsung-that we now turn.
II.
WHY PARTIES, REDUX
The functional role of parties in the political system can be divided into
three areas: governance, elections, and citizenship.67 In governance, political
parties solve social choice problems in legislatures, frame the terms of debate,
legitimize opposition, and stabilize the political order. For voters in elections,
63. Compare MATSUSAKA, supra note 26, and Simon Hug, Policy Consequences of Direct
Legislation Theory, Empirical Models and Evidence, 45 QUALITY & QUANTITY 559 (2011)
(confirming Matsusaka thesis using new modeling techniques and dataset that others had used to
challenge the thesis), with Melissa J. Marschall & Anirudh V.S. Ruhil, Of Models and Methods: A
Response to Matsusaka, 5 STATE POL. & POL'Y Q. 364 (2005) (challenging Matsusaka's method and
findings), and Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States (2010)
(working paper), available at http://www.columbia.edu/-jrl2124/democratic%20deficit.pdf (using
state-of-the-art methods to measure median voter preferences and finding no effect of direct
democracy on policy congruence across a host of issue areas).
64. Another complication comes from recent research on the Continent suggesting that direct
democracy sometimes strengthens political parties, especially minor parties. See Maduz, supra note
56, at 7-8.
65. One of us has a quick and dirty sketch for the uninitiated at Leib, supra note 8. A pro list
(with relevant citations) is available id. at 904-06. A con list (with citations) is available id. at 906-11.
66. See supra notes 27 & 29.
67. Many thanks to Patrick Sellers for taking a first pass at drafting sections of Part II.
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political parties furnish simple, reliable cues to candidates' positions (helping
low-information voters to cast ballots that accord with their policy preferences);
make the dominant governing coalitions legible (enabling retrospective voting);
and mobilize turnout (helping to solve the collective action problem that results
from the miniscule probability that any one citizen's vote will shift an election's
outcome). Finally, parties enhance the practice of citizenship because they give
citizens a broad non-ascriptive basis for social solidarity, they make political
participation efficacious, and, arguably, because they furnish starting points for
public debate. Of course, these three environments-governance, elections, and
citizenship-are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the benefits political
parties offer in each context are distinct enough to warrant separate analyses.
Together, these benefits help counter some of the more aggressive attacks on
party democracy from within popular democracy and elsewhere.
A. Parties in Governance
Although the natural instability of democratic states is not always openly
appreciated, democratic systems are inherently precarious. The proper method
of constituting and administering the state is always a core issue in elections.
Successful democracies, then, are those states capable of repeatedly creating
opportunities for conflict and repeatedly ensuring that any potential conflict is
peaceful,69 a phenomena Rosenblum calls "regulated rivalry. '70 Elections alone
are not enough to ensure stable democracies. To successfully manage conflict,
democracies must also create some method of legitimizing and
institutionalizing a role for citizens opposed to the victorious governing
regime.71 When a democratic system offers minorities neither a legitimate role
in governance nor a realistic hope for becoming or joining the ruling coalition
in the next cycle, it risks collapse. 72 Enter the political party.
Political parties create a desire for stability in both the majority and
minority. 73 Through their organizational advantages, political parties make it
possible for one election's losing side to more easily organize for a victory in
the next contest. 74 The ability to lose one election but still win another election
in the future creates the incentive to transfer power peaceably.75 Such stability
68. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS (2009);
Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in DEMOCRACY'S VALUE 23-55
(Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cord6n, eds., 1999).
69. Id. at 49.
70. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 119-26.
71. Przeworski, supra note 68, at 50.
72. Id.
73. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 121. The Supreme Court of the United States signed onto the
stability story in Timmons v. Twin Cities New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
74. JOHN W. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN AMERICA 25 (1995).
75. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 123. White & Ypi also emphasize continuity and ongoing
political agency, supra note 3, at 811-12.
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not only creates broader political moderation and legitimacy, but it also keeps
the party in power on its toes, forcing it to engage the issues of the day. As
Daniel Defoe put it, "The Party who are Out, are always a Curb, and a Bridle to
those which are In." 76 This is the "social function of antagonism"-helping to
refine, moderate, justify, and facilitate the discovery of equilibria through
dialectical "trial by discussion." 77 As Clinton Rossiter famously put it, "No
America without democracy, no democracy without politics, no politics
without parties, no parties without compromise and moderation.,
78
Parties also stabilize government in another, more logistical respect.
Without parties in a legislature, the coalition behind most any bill is at risk of
unraveling. Lawmakers who favor a bill as a matter of principle may be bought
off by opposing legislators who promise either to support other legislation
providing district-specific benefits for the defector or to provide key
endorsements or funding for the defector's reelection campaign. As John
Aldrich argues, the realization of a politics of principle requires a solution to
this collective action problem, and political parties can provide it.7 9 Parties bind
lawmakers together into "long coalitions" centered on recurring, ideologically-
linked issues that lawmakers and voters care about. In return for the use of the
party's organizational advantage and assistance in winning office, politicians
80promise some degree of allegiance to the party's policy agenda. Parties in
turn can reward or discipline affiliated lawmakers through committee
assignments and the distribution of campaign funds, thereby holding the
coalition together.
B. Parties in Elections
Parties not only function to organize governance; they also improve
elections. The essential difficulties that elections present for ordinary voters are
problems of information and coordination. Voters need information about the
policy positions and priorities of the candidates, about the coalition of legislators
in control of the government, and about the relationship of the candidates to the
dominant governing coalition. Yet even this information is not enough.
Imagine a legislative race in which the incumbent faces off against three
opponents. A majority of the voters are unhappy with the dominant governing
coalition and wish to effect a change. The three challengers each present a
politically distinct alternative to the incumbent. A majority of the voters prefer
all three to the incumbent but are divided as to which is the most preferred
alternative. Absent some coordination mechanism, voters who prefer all three
76. 3 DANIEL DEFOE: HIS LIFE, AND RECENTLY DIsCOvERED WRITINGS: EXTENDING FROM
1716 To 1729, at 134 (William Lee ed., 1869).
77. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 136-56 (drawing from Hume and Mill).
78. CLINTON RosslTER, PARTIES AND PoLrIcs IN AMERICA 1 (1960).
79. ALDRICH, supra note 74, at 37-41.
80. Id. at 25.
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challengers are likely to split their votes, inadvertently returning the
incumbent to office.
Now expand the picture and consider multiple legislative districts. If
voters in district A manage to coordinate on an alternative to the incumbent,
and voters in district B succeed as well, but the challengers elected in districts
A and B do not have an agreed upon or overlapping agenda, the change
effected at the district level will not yield a predictable change in the outputs of
government. A new governing coalition may form, but whether the legislator
from district A or B will be part of it is anyone's guess.
Parties go a long way toward solving these problems. The organization of
legislatures along party lines helps make the then-dominant governing coalition
(if there is one) legible to voters. The labeling of candidates according to party
suggests the candidates' likely policy positions and tells voters whether any
given candidate will join or work against the dominant coalition. Parties also
solve the coordination problem faced by voters dissatisfied with the governing
coalition's performance. Once voters can see the principal coalition ("party") in
the legislature, voters who are unhappy with the status quo can coordinate and
focus on the candidates unified in opposition to that party. If enough voters
agree that the opposition is better than the incumbents, a new coalition will
come into power and have a chance to implement the agenda on which its
candidates ran.81 In other words, parties can make voting effective.
Of course, parties are not the only players in the electoral arena. Interest
groups are also involved, and knowledge of interest-group endorsements and
expenditures can help voters cast ballots in accordance with the voters'
preferences. 82 Interest group "cues," however, are no substitute for party cues.
Party cues are relevant to larger swaths of the electorate; party cues are
informed by observations about governmental policymaking and performance
over time; and party cues can enable retrospective accountability. 83 Parties
81. See Austin Ramney, Party Responsibility, in 16 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 11, 103-06 (Neil Smelser & Paul Bates eds., 2001); FIORINA, supra note 4;
Morris Fiorina, The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics, DkDALUS, Summer
1980, at 25. To be sure, the political science discipline is not of one mind about the possibilities for
retrospective accountability. See generally Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias
in Political Perceptions, 24 POL. BEHAVIOR 117 (2002); David R. Jones & Monika L. McDermott,
The Responsible Party Government Model in House and Senate Elections, 48 AM. J. POL. SC. 1
(2004). There are also obvious complications with retrospective voting in jurisdictions where there is
no partisan competition-see, e.g., V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION
(1949)-and when voters face regimes of divided government, when it is not easy to know whom to
blame for outcomes. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL,
LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-1990 (1991); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974). More on the problems with retrospective accountability anon.
82. ARTHuR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS
LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 69-77 (1998).
83. See Elmendorf& Schleicher, supra note 5, at 56 (comparing party cues and interest-group
cues); Cheryl Boudreau, Conflicting Cues, Consistent Opinions? How Party Cues and Endorsements
Affect Public Opinion (2011) (working paper) (on file with authors) (using laboratory experiments to
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integrate interest-group concerns into a larger policy agenda.84 In a political
world without parties, special interest groups, incumbents, celebrities, and
consultants would be more powerful, not less so.
85
California politics during the 1910-52 period illustrates the essential
importance of parties and party-labeled ballots. During this time, cross-filing
was permitted and party labels did not appear on primary ballots.86 Eradicating
party labels was a Progressive reform, as popular democrats sought to undo
party democracy.8 7 But the effect of this reform was not quite what the
Progressives had anticipated. Incumbents ran in both major-party primaries and
regularly won both nominations; name recognition trumped all in the low-
information world of state legislative primary elections. The resulting
legislature was centrist-but slothful and corrupt. The most powerful legi-
slative coalitions were not organized on party lines and as such were invisible
to voters. Legislators did not create party-based "long" coalitions to pursue
ideological objectives, as Aldrich would have predicted.88 Rather, out-of-
government interest-group coalitions (mostly unions) eventually pushed a
ballot initiative to end cross-filing because they wanted a partisan legislature
that would actually do something. The legislature responded with a
compromise measure to add party labels to candidates on primary ballots,
which ultimately passed.
Adding party labels to ballots was the beginning of the end for cross-
filing. Once party labels were introduced on the ballot, incumbent Democrats
were rarely nominated in Republican primaries and vice versa. Party labels
enabled elections to function in line with our reasonable expectations and
reduced the likelihood of corruption and sloth in the legislature.
In addition to informing voters of candidate ideology and enabling
retrospective accountability, the organization of politics through political
parties serves to mobilize political participation. Parties get voters to the polls.
As California's experience in the 1910-52 period reveals, the absence of
meaningful partisan competition means that incumbents will almost always be
reelected.8 9 Absence of competition not only makes elections stale, but it also
show that party cues have much more powerful opinion-shaping effects than cues from party-affiliated
interest groups). The inadequacy of interest-group cues may also be inferred from the poor
performance of nonpartisan elections. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 5, 26-29 (reviewing
studies of nonpartisan elections).
84. Zachary Elkins et al., The Citizen as Founder: Public Participation in Constitutional
Approval, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 368-69 (2008).
85. See LARRY J. SABATO, THE PARTY'S JUST BEGUN: SHAPING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR
AMERICA'S FUTURE 205-06,210 (1988).
86. This narrative is engagingly told in SETH E. MASKET, No MIDDLE GROUND: HOW
INFORMAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS CONTROL NOMINATIONS AND POLARIZE LEGISLATURES (2009).
87. See supra Section I.A.
88. See supra Section II.A (discussing Aldrich's theory of parties as solution to collective
action problem faced by legislators).
89. See MASKET, supra note 86.
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can make politicians less responsive to ordinary citizens. Party-mobilized mass
turnout is necessary lest elections end up creating perverse incentives for
lawmakers to serve only narrow, self-organized factions within the political
community.
90
C. Parties for Citizenship
There is a powerful story about citizenship, where the virtuous citizens are
the "independents"-those who affiliate with no party.9 1 Because partisans are
often thought of as slaves to, ideologies and parties, they are routinely
considered to fail the test of the good citizen, someone who deliberates afresh
about social policy and gives every argument a fair hearing. Independence-as-
virtue is inherited from the Progressives, 92 and the romance of independence
continues to this day, perhaps made even more alluring in this age of seeming
"hyperpolarization." 93 As Muirhead states the problem, "partisanship appears to
reflect bias, thoughtlessness, cowardice of mind, asocial contentiousness, and
faltering devotion to the common good.",
94
We do not deny that this criticism of parties has some force. Citizens'
"party identification" 95 is sometimes too strong to be normatively attractive.
For many citizens, party identification is essentially an inherited characteristic,
adopted as a matter of familial loyalty or genetic code.96 Such partisans seem to
"reason" only emotionally and mostly unconsciously;97 party identification
98determines more than it derives from beliefs. Studies have shown that partyidentification biases perceptions of social and economic facts9 9 as well as
90. See Elkins et al., supra note 84, at 379-80; Stephen M. Griffin, California
Constitutionalism: Trust in Government and Direct Democracy, II U. PA. J. CONST. L. 551, 571
(2009).
91. Though "independence" may also be seen as a failure of the parties. See ZOLTAN L.
HAJNAL & TAEKU LEE, WHY AMERICANS DON'T JOIN THE PARTY: RACE, IMMIGRATION, AND THE
FAILURE (OF POLITICAL PARTIES) TO ENGAGE THE ELECTORATE (2011).
92. OSTROGORSKI,supranote41, at216-17.
93. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011).
94. Muirhead, supra note 3, at 714.
95. The basic work laying out the concept-which is now central to political science-is
ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960).
96. See generally DONALD GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS: POLITICAL
PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS (2002); Richard G. Niemi & M. Kent Jennings,
Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party Identification, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 970 (1991).
97. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 323 (citing Joshua Freedman, This Is Your Brain on Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at A25; Benedict Carey, A Shocker: Partisan Thought Is Unconscious,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at Dl).
98. Chistopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, It Feels Like We're Thinking: The Ration-alizing
Voter and Electoral Democracy (Aug. 28, 2006) (working paper), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-bartels/papers.
99. See, e.g., Adam R. Brown, Are Governors Responsible for the State Economy?
Partisanship, Blame, and Divided Federalism, 72 J. POL. 605, 606 (2010) (finding that voters'
perceptions of economic conditions are colored by partisan identification with or against party in
control of executive branch of government).
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attributions of political responsibility across levels of government."' New
research has also shown that independents vote quite reliably for the most
ideologically proximate candidate in congressional and presidential elections,
whereas strong party identifiers tend to favor their team's nominee even if the
opposing candidate is ideologically closer to the voter. 0
Yet partisanship does contribute to the practice of citizenship, even
allowing for the fact that it biases some people's attitudes and beliefs.
"Independents" tend not to identify with one another across a broad range of
issues. The same is not true of partisans, who-despite differences in race,
class, gender, ethnicity, and religion-feel some degree of social solidarity and
therefore facilitate social integration.!°2 Solidarity and integration are central to
an engaged citizenship, where citizens appreciate their stake and role in the
broader political community. An independent's vote can always be bought, is
always for sale, and is always individual. Parties, by contrast, allow
Southerners and Northerners, rich and poor, whites and minorities, and
Christians and Muslims to feel that they are connected in a shared or
overlapping political narrative. The partisan makes a "good faith effort to stand
with a group striving for democratic legitimacy."10 3 The independent is in a tent
of her own, a tent that cannot, by definition, include a broad swath of other
citizens. And the large tent, ironically enough, has tended to make party
identification salient and penetrating!104
Second, independents' political disengagement sits in tension with the
presumptive aspirations of participatory democracy. Consider these findings
100. See id. (showing that voters apportion blame for poor economic performance between
governor and president on basis of voter's partisan preference for one or the other); Neil Malhotra &
Alexander G. Kuo, Attributing Blame: The Public's Response to Hurricane Katrina, 70 J. POL. 120
(2008) (showing that party cues cause individuals to blame opposite-party more than own-party
officials for poor government response to natural disaster).
101. Stephen A. Jesse, Testing the Spatial Voting Theory in the 2008 Presidential Election 2
(2011) (working paper), available at https://webspace.utexas.edu/sjessee/www/research-
files/spatial08.pdf ("While the behavior of independents is strongly consistent with the predictions of
unbiased spatial voting, partisans show strong bias toward their party's nominee above and beyond
what would be predicted by their ideological position ...."); Boris Shor & Jon C. Rogowski,
Congressional Voting by Spatial Reasoning (Aug. 25, 2010) (working paper), available at
http:/ssm.com/abstract-1676841 (finding similar results in study of House and Senate elections). Note
that the partisans' tendency to favor their own party's candidate over the opposition candidate does not
necessarily mean that they are voting irrationally or against their interests/ideology. Voting for the
candidate of a given party is a way of strengthening that party in the legislature, and so long as the
voter is ideologically closer to the median legislator of her party than the median legislator of the
opposing party, it can still be rational to vote for a less ideologically proximate own-party candidate
over a more proximate opposite-party candidate--assuming there is some degree of party cohesion or
control within the legislative chamber.
102. The point developed here is specific to political systems (such as ours) that induce the
development of large, bridging political parties, as opposed to systems that provide more-or-less
proportional representations for numerous small, narrowly focused parties.
103. Muirhead, supranote 3, at 719.
104. See generally Sidney Verba et al., Reply to Reviews, 91 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 427, 429
(1997).
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about independents: they vote in low numbers and know less about the
issues. 10 5 Even if most independents in the United States are, as political
scientists tell us, "closet Democrats or Republicans," ' 0 6 as a group they fail to
impress from the standpoint of participatory democracy. Surely, we cannot
make a political virtue out of lack of participation in the very processes that
define a democracy.
Finally, a deliberative ideal of citizenship according to which citizens
decide policy consistent with the force of the better argument cannot envision
citizens starting with "a view from nowhere." Good deliberation should involve
a point of view, values, and recognition that any policy decision requires
pressing hard on one's beliefs and ideas. Parties set the stage for rooted and
meaningful deliberation. As Rosenblum puts it, "Deliberation is likely to be
interesting and urgent only when it is about choosing sides. By their regular
participation and exhibition of emotional commitment, partisans demonstrate
that making decisions and choosing sides is a value." 10 7
Of course, just because we can list three spheres of influence where
parties may potentially serve to improve democracy does not mean that parties
always function properly-nor does it mean democratic society should
continue without refinement from popular democracy. Indeed, the reconciled
view we embrace requires an appreciation both for how exercises of popular
democracy can improve party democracy and for how party democracy can
improve popular democracy, a view we explore in more detail in the next Part.
Nothing can guarantee that these two democratic forces will combine for
mutual optimization, but blending of party democracy with popular democracy
is possible and desirable when it comes to practical institutional design. Part III
attempts to construct a framework for complementarity by identifying some
recurring inadequacies of party democracy and popular democracy; it then
applies that framework to two conversations about democratic design.
105. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 95, at 143; JACK C. DOPPELT & ELLEN SHEARER,
NONVOTERS: AMERICA'S No-SHows 22 (1999); BRUCE E. KEITH ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE
INDEPENDENT VOTER 24, 41-55, 166-67 (1992); Andr6 Blais, What Affects Voter Turnout?, 9 ANN.
REv. POL. ScI 111 (2006). This is not altogether uncontroversial. Because about 40 percent of
Americans now say they are independents (since 2000), it is harder to generalize about them than it
once was. See, e.g., Russell J. Dalton, Review Symposium: Parties, Partisanship, and Democratic
Politics, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 628, 629 (2009) ("[A] larger share of these new independents are politically
aware and engaged-the antipartisanship label is less applicable to this group than a postpartisanship
label."). And, as noted earlier, those independents who bother to vote seem to vote in an ideologically
coherent fashion. See supra note 101.
106. KEITH ET AL.,supra note 105, at4.
107. ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 310. Obviously, for this to work, there must be not only
parties but a system of parties. This point is elaborated upon in John Aldrich, Review Symposium:
Parties, Partisanship, andDemocratic Politics, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 621, 625 (2009).
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III.
COMPLEMENTARITIES
Thus far, we have exposed the conventional story about the contest
between party and popular democracy and explained why parties tend to be
good for the republic in a manner sufficient to encourage popular democrats to
be more circumspect about their too-quick dismissal of party democrats. But
we have not yet argued directly for our complementarity vision or given it any
more specific contours. That argument unfolds below, as we highlight some
recurring design problems within party democracy and popular democracy.
Once those internal inadequacies are revealed, the sibling democratic system
proves to be a viable design solution to help the other function better. We then
apply those design guideposts in two recent contexts that show the usefulness
of our complementarity view as well as the pathologies of the conflictual view.
A. Some Diagnoses and Suggestions for Combining
the Parties and the People
The discussion in Part II reveals that parties are supposed to be working as
a check against one another. Whether it is to moderate policy through
"regulated rivalry," to frame elections in a way that collate salient issues for the
electorate into policy packages that are clearly distinguishable, or to furnish
deliberating partisans with arguments about the opposition's shortcomings, the
benefits of the American party system depend upon its ability to generate two
broad but differentiated coalitions that appeal to the median voter and take
turns in power. When the party system fails these tasks-when parties appeal
only to narrow factions in their respective bases or when one party enjoys a de
facto lock on political power-the stabilizing, legitimating, and informational
benefits of party democracy are lost.'
0 8
1. Two Problems with Party Democracy
While federal democracies like the United States with single-member
districts and first-past-the-post elections generally yield two-party systems,' 0 9
healthy two-party competition is not assured. Two problems recur. First, the
parties may fail to develop competitive, well-tailored brands for purposes of
elections in subnational jurisdictions (e.g., states and cities) whose median
voter is well to the left or right of the national median or whose issue space (the
dimensions of political conflict) differs in some significant respect from the
issue space of national politics. 110 Many forces can work against the
108. For an analysis of how breakdowns in partisan competition undercut the informational
value of the party cue, see Elmendorf& Schleicher, supra note 5, at 35-50.
109. See DUVERGER, supra note 21, at 217.
110. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 5, at 35-50. For the first treatment of the problem,
see David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections? The Role of
Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007).
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development of party sub-brands that are tailored to the issue space and
electorate of subnational governments. These forces include voter inattention to
subnational politics; an uneven geographic distribution of highly affective
partisans (by national party ID); election laws, such as voter registration rules,
that tend to unify parties across levels of government; and the strategic
calculations of party-affiliated actors who aim to move up to a higher level of
government through a vertically integrated party organization.111 The result
may be long runs of one-party dominance in a state or city, with little pressure
on that party to govern responsibly. We will call this competitive breakdown.
The other recurring problem with American party democracy is
accountability occlusion, which occurs when constitutional structures obscure
who was responsible for a particular act, making it difficult for voters to trace
responsibility for the conditions they observe to the party in control of
government. For example, separated powers and supermajority decision rules
often prevent the legislative majority party from governing without winning the
support of at least some minority-party representatives. 112 Figuring out which
party is more to blame for policies adopted via backroom, cross-party deals is
no easy task.
Another source of accountability occlusion is the ballot initiative. The
more often law gets made through ballot initiatives, whose sponsors are various
and obscure, the less it makes sense for ordinary voters to blame the party in
government for policy outcomes the voters do not like. 113 Notably, the ballot
initiative has been used in some states essentially to pre-allocate significant
portions of the annual budget, diminishing the majority party's authority to
make the hard fiscal tradeoffs at the core of governance. 14
111. Id.
112. Each of the fifty states has one or more separately elected executive officials. (Regarding
separately elected "plural executives" at the state level, see infra note 115.) And at last count, sixteen
required supermajority votes for the passage of certain revenue measures. Bert Waisanen, State Tax
and Expenditure Limits-2008, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
Default.aspx?Tabld=12633#othertax (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). On the federal side, the increasing
use of the filibuster in the Senate also transforms the body into a supermajoritarian institution. But the
separation of powers, bicameralism, and presentment can also be characterized as a form of
supermajoritarian hurdle for all legislation. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our
Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REv. 703, 712-15 (2002).
113. There is some evidence that cognitive burden of voting on multiple ballot measures
undermines citizens' ability to vote correctly in partisan elections for representatives, even in high-
profile races for president. See Richard R. Lau et al., An Exploration of Correct Voting in U.S.
Presidential Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCi. 395, 405 (2008) ("[A] large number of propositions on the
ballot evidently distract[s] voters from the presidential election, and at its maximum is associated with
an 11 percent decrease in the probability of a correct vote ....").
114. The extent to which this is a problem is subject to debate. See, e.g., John G. Matsusaka,
Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter Initiatives Paralyzed the California Budget?, 5
STATE POL. & POL'Y Q. 248 (2005) (challenging the conventional wisdom); BRUCE E. CAIN &
GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., ARE CALIFORNIA's FISCAL
CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL OR POLITICAL? 26 (2008), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/
pubs/report/R_1208BCR.pdf (arguing that "[t]here is a danger of overestimating the effects of
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On the executive side, many state constitutions parcel out the power to
implement the law among separately elected governors, attorney generals,
comptrollers, insurance commissioners, education commissioners, and other
officials.11 5 Christopher Berry and Jacob Gersen have argued that such "plural
executive" arrangements can enhance accountability, as they empower voters
who are dissatisfied with outcomes in particular policy domains to allocate
blame more precisely. 116  Voters should not vote out the insurance
commissioner if their concerns are with the schools. But plural executives
multiply the informational demands on voters-requiring voters to monitor a
much larger number of officials-and they interfere with priority setting,
coordination, and party-based accountability for policy implementation.
1 7
The competitive-breakdown and accountability-occlusion problems are
deep and multifaceted. They are also related: When one party has a lock on
government, it faces little pressure to honor the concerns of the median voter.
The only elections that will matter are the dominant party's primaries, and
primary elections are low-information, low-participation affairs that do little for
democratic responsiveness.1 18 If the majority party faces little pressure to govern
well or responsibly, ordinary citizens will naturally favor structural checks on its
ability to govern1 19- h en ce the ballot initiative, plural executives, term limits,
budgetary set asides, and supermajority-decision rules for revenue bills.120
procedural reform and of underestimating the degree to which the underlying problems are political,"
and that "[i]n the end, rules do not determine budgets; voter preferences do").
115. On the plural executive see Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 49-50 (forthcoming); Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E Gersen, The Unbundled Executive,
75 U. CH. L. REv. 1385 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory
of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696 (2009).
116. Berry &Gersen, supranote 115, at 1405.
117. See Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 115, at 1727-28; Rodriguez, supra note 115. See also
Vikrarn David Amar, Lessons from California's Recent Experience with Its Non-Unitary (Divided)
Executive: Of Mayors, Governors, Controllers, and Attorneys General, 59 EMORY L.J. 469 (2009)
(chronicling conflicts between, inter alia, a Republican Governor and a Democratic Controller during
California's fiscal crisis).
118. On the limits of primary elections as a source of democratic responsiveness, see
Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 5, at 29-31, and sources cited therein.
119. They may also support reforms that diminish the party's control over the nomination of
candidates, such as the "top 2" nonpartisan primaries recently adopted in Washington and California
(on which see Top 2 Primary Frequently Asked Questions, WASH. SECRETARY STATE,
http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/Pages/Top2PrimaryFAQ.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2011);
California Proposition 14 Top Two Primaries Act, BALLOTPEIDA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/
index.php/CaliforniaProposition_14,_TopTwo_Primaries_Act (June 2010) (last visited Nov. 29,
2011)).
120. New research by Robert McGrath shows that the frequency of ballot initiative use is
strongly and positively correlated with uncompetitive elections for representatives, conditional on
ideological divergence between citizens and their representatives, suggesting that voters turn to the
initiative when the normal forces of electoral competition are not working properly. See Robert
McGrath, Electoral Competition and the Frequency of Initiative Use in the US. States, 39 AM. POL.
RES. 611 (2011).
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2. How a Targeted Injection of Popular Democracy Could Help Cure the Ills of
Party Democracy
The competitive-breakdown and accountability-occlusion problems are
not going to be solved by simply adding "more popular democracy" to the mix.
Indeed, as noted above, frequent use of the ballot initiative can aggravate
accountability occlusion by making it less certain whether the majority party is
responsible for policies the voter dislikes. But, against the conventional
narrative of opposition between party and popular democracy, a careful
integration of popular democracy into party governance could go some distance
toward ameliorating the accountability occlusion and competitive breakdown
problems. The key is to recognize, first, that referendum calls by parties can be
used as substitutes for more conventional checks on overreaching by the
legislative majority and, second, that party-initiated votes on direct legislation
would help to clarify what the parties stand for.
Consider how a dose of popular democracy could benefit those states that
require legislative supermajorities to pass certain types of legislation. Imagine
that the state instead permitted the majority party to adopt such measures
unilaterally, provided that the bill also passed a referendum vote. The popular-
approval condition would press the majority party to heed the concerns of
voters in the middle of the political spectrum--even if, owing to competitive
breakdown, that party does not fear losing its majority status in the next
election.121 The referendum performs a checking function similar to the one
more familiarly associated with supermajority or presentment requirements.122
And, of central importance for present purposes, substituting the referendum
for a supermajority-decision rule would clarify which party was responsible for
the policy adopted. If voters do not like the policy in retrospect, they can vote
for the other team in the next election. A state that replaces its supermajority-
vote requirement with a party-initiated referendum substitutes an
accountability-enhancing check for an accountability-occluding one.
121. This assumes that, in the run of cases, (1) the voters who turn out in the referendum
election are representative of the electorate as a whole (more likely if the referendum is held in
connection with a general election than a primary); and (2) voters in the aggregate understand the
proposal well enough to express meaningful opinions at the ballot box. These conditions do not have
to be satisfied perfectly or in every case, however. Even if they hold only probabilistically, the majority
party is still likely to "check itself' in anticipation of the referendum hurdle.
122. The checking functions are similar in that they make it harder for a well-organized faction
in the legislature to give effect to the interests of the few or the ideologies of the extremes. But of
course there are differences too: to the extent that the opposition party represents minority interests, its
"check" is likely to better protect those interests than the check of the median voter in a referendum
election. "Checking" performed by an executive or an opposition party in government is also more
likely to reflect strategic electoral calculations, whereas checking performed by the electorate is more
likely to reflect the popular passions of the moment. More considered popular checks may be achieved
through dual-referendum requirements (spaced out over a period of time) of the sort that Bruce
Ackerman recommends for constitutional amendment. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The New Separation
of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 666-68 (2000).
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Going a step further, state constitutional reformers should also consider
allowing each major-party legislative caucus to put its top priority to a
referendum vote (say, one bill per legislative session). 23 The ballot title and
summary for each measure should describe it as the party's top legislative
priority. Voters would decide whether one, both, or neither measure becomes
law. This procedure would help to clarify what each party stands for with
respect to the government in question, while also pushing the party coalitions to
frame and modulate their agendas in ways that appeal to the median voter. For
a long-out-of-power minority party, the opportunity to put its priorities directly
to a popular vote could be a critical first step toward developing a competitive,
state-specific brand. 
124
It might seem odd or even undemocratic to give a minority party the
opportunity to effectuate its objectives without first winning a majority of seats
in the legislature, but that objection rests on an improperly static and
formalistic understanding of "democracy." Healthy democracy requires more
than the election of lawmakers followed by the cobbling together of fifty-one-
percent coalitions to pass bills. Healthy democracy involves representatives
who coalesce into ideologically coherent governing coalitions that voters can
see and understand; healthy democracy gives voters a sense of where their
representative stands vis-A-vis the governing and principal opposition
coalitions; and healthy democracy requires an opposition coalition that has a
realistic shot of winning power if the majority-party proves corrupt,
incompetent, or insensitive to the concerns of the median voter. If the major
opposition party is a rump, so long out of power that voters have no
experiential sense of what it stands for or would do if returned to power,
democracy will suffer. Reforms that help that party to credibly communicate
what it stands for, and that encourage the party to adopt positions that are
marketable to the median voter, are democracy enhancing.
The "it's not democratic" objection to giving the minority party direct
access to a referendum ballot looks even weaker when one considers how the
states limit ballot access for purposes of voting on initiatives. Formally,
initiative proponents are required to gather the signatures of a certain number of
registered voters, often defined as a percentage of the citizens who voted in the
last gubernatorial election. 125 In practice, gathering signatures requires
123. This suggestion is also advanced in Elmendorf& Schleicher, supra note 5, at 59-60.
124. As Elmendorf & Schleicher observe, id. at 48, a long-out-of-power party faces a credible
commitment problem in trying to build a competitive brand at the state or local level, especially if the
party's national brand is disfavored in the locality. The party must convince local voters that it will in
fact do what it says it will do if returned to power. Giving the party a limited opportunity to "speak
when it counts"-for example, authority to put a measure on the ballot in its name-is one way to
enable the party to build a local reputation based on deed as well as word.
125. Initiative Petition Signature Requirements, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 7,
2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16585.
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money-and only money. 126 Professional firms gather the signatures for ballot-
initiative proponents, and they charge for their services. If anyone willing to put
up several million dollars can have a law of his drafting put to a popular vote
on enactment, it is hard to see the "democratic" objection to allowing the
principal opposition caucus in the legislature-which after all consists of
lawmakers who have actually won elections-to put a measure before the
people as well.
One might also object to the legislative-caucus referendum on the ground
that it is simply unnecessary. If leaders of the majority or minority party have
been unable to enact their top priority reforms through the ordinary legislative
process, they still can, in their capacity as citizens, circulate petitions and
qualify the measure for the ballot as initiated legislation. But there is a big
difference between putting a measure on the ballot by citizen initiative and
doing so under a formal procedure whereby each party declares its top priority
and puts the corresponding reform on the ballot-a ballot that labels the
measure as the party's top priority. Ordinary, low-information voters in
initiative and referendum elections frequently know little about the measures on
which they are voting apart from what they learn from the ballot itself.127 The
fact that actors affiliated with the California Republican Party's legislative
leadership, for example, put Proposition X on the ballot may be lost on many
voters unless the ballot says as much. Furthermore, a ballot label which notes
such an affiliation between the measure and a party is obviously less
informative than one which declares that the measure is the party caucus's top
legislative priority. Finally, the establishment of a de jure procedure for the
party caucuses in the legislature to put their top priority to a popular vote on
enactment would probably result in new political conventions, internal to each
party, for deciding and declaring priorities. The corresponding debate and give-
and-take would itself help educate voters about the parties-in-government.
3. Improving Popular Democracy Through an Injection of Party Democracy
Party democracy is not the only thing that can be improved by its sibling
democratic modality. Popular democracy routinely suffers difficulties that party
democracy is well suited to ameliorate. As we have noted, initiative and
referendum elections are low-information environments. Popular democracy
relies on the common sense of the electorate, but that common sense must be
126. Elizabeth M. Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1845, 1849-54 (1999).
127. On ballot wording effects, see, for example, BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 27, at 55-
59 (finding disparate effect of self-interest on respondents' position on a school voucher ballot
initiative, depending on whether respondents were provided with the proposition's ballot description
and name, or the name alone); Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, The Case of the Stolen Initiative:
Were the Voters Framed? (Sept. 10, 2010) (working paper), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1643448 (using survey experiments to demonstrate effect of question wording on public
support).
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applied against a background of meaningful information and policy knowledge.
Interest groups are routinely trying to fill the knowledge gap, and there is a
great deal of hope that heuristics and proxies can give citizens the information
they need to make sound decisions in direct democracy.1 28 But parties furnish
the best, most broadly relevant cues 129-the use of which is rarely facilitated by
current direct-democracy systems.
Yet these direct elections could and probably should make greater use of
party signals. Specifically, the party organizations, or the party-caucuses in the
legislature, could be authorized to make ballot-printed endorsements of
initiatives that citizens have qualified for the ballot.' 30 Just as the "D" or "R!"
next to a candidate's name helps low-information voters decide how to vote, so
too could the indications "State Democratic Party recommends YES" and
"State Republican Party recommends NO" next to the title and summary of a
ballot initiative. 31 The party labels would certainly convey more reliable
information than the ballot summary itself, which is often crafted by a partial
government official and written in a manner that defies comprehension by the
less-well-educated members of the electorate.1
32
128. For a recent and fairly optimistic literature review arguing that the weight of the evidence
supports the view that citizens perform pretty well in direct democracy, see Maduz, supra note 56, at
3-4. For a more skeptical take, see Ehnendorf & Schleicher, supra note 5, at 31-34. Competence can
be measured in many ways, and cues certainly can be misused by the electorate. See, e.g., Arthur
Lupia & Richard Johnston, Are Voters to Blame? Voter Competence and Elite Maneuvers in
Referendums, in REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 193-95; Cheryl Boudreau, The Market
for Political Information: How the Consumption of Information Affects Citizens' Decisions 13, 22-25
(Jan. 17, 2011) (working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1742556 (showing that subjects
in laboratory experiments rely on superficial opirion polls, even when given more probative cues).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
130. This suggestion is also advanced in Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 5, at 58. It is
probably better for states to delegate responsibility for assigning the party label to the parties'
legislative caucuses, rather than to the party organization as such. The "party brand" as the public sees
and understands surely has much more to do with the behavior and choices of party-affiliated
legislators than party-organization insiders. Cf Jonathan Woon & Jeremy C. Pope, Made in Congress?
Testing the Electoral Implications of Party Ideological Brand Names, 70 J. POL. 823, 825 (2008)
(showing that roll-call votes taken by members of Congress affect voter perceptions of party brands);
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1741, 1766-70 (1993) (commenting on obscurity of major parties' organizational leadership,
in contrast to their legislative leadership). However, the party organization might have a viable First
Amendment claim against a state law that delegated to the party caucus in the legislature authority to
speak in the party's name. Cf Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 233 (1989)
(deeming state interference with "internal organization" of political parties presumptively
unconstitutional). A First Amendment challenge would probably fail, however, if the ballot clearly
stated that the endorsement was made by the party's legislative caucus. Cf Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 458-59 (2008) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
primary elections with candidate self-labeling of party affiliation, on ground that plaintiffs had not
shown that reasonable voters would be confused about who assigned the label).
131. It will also help voters who know something about the initiative measure in question to
develop a better understanding of their state parties, and the clearer the voter's picture of the state
parties, the less risk of competitive breakdown.
132. For a state-by-state rundown of who drafts the ballot title and summary, see Preparation
of a Ballot Title and Summary, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2002),
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The parties also have important but as-yet-unexplored roles to play in the
deliberative forums at the vanguard of popular democracy. Consider jury
decision making: there, citizens make decisions by adjudicating disputes
between zealous advocates, not in a vacuum or through mere shortcuts. 133 The
zealous advocates are the ones who set the agenda, frame the debate, and gather
relevant and persuasive evidence upon which decision makers express their
ultimate judgments. It is hard to see how a "citizens assembly" or "policy jury"
comprised of lay citizens selected at random could possibly arrive at a
democratic decision or recommendation without some outside agent setting the
agenda or framing the debate. Rather, it is more likely that the body would
collapse in disarray or that a handful of charismatic or clever members who
organize from within the body will capture it.
The agenda-setting problem in an assembly of lay citizens is not unlike
the agenda-setting problem faced by legislatures. Legislatures solve the
problem principally through parties, and the organization of elections on party
lines legitimizes this solution. The political parties could play a somewhat ana-
logous role with respect to deliberative bodies comprised of randomly selected
citizens. The deliberating citizens need not be organized into "party caucuses"
from within, but the parties, or actors affiliated with the parties, could be used
to winnow the field of options for the citizens to consider and to present the
initial set of arguments and witnesses for and against the alternatives.
In many of the experiments to date with deliberative citizen bodies, these
agenda-setting and information-provision functions have been performed by
putatively neutral experts, usually academics. 134 But if citizen bodies are to be
delegated important, real-world responsibilities-as under California's recently
adopted model for redistricting by citizens commission135 and as under various
proposals for the use of citizen bodies to draft political or constitutional reforms
that would then go to a referendum vote-then academics will not and should
not continue to perform this role. "Neutral expertise" too often cloaks unspoken
agendas and interest groups who feel-or pretend to feel-that their
perspective was given short shrift are sure to attack the process as illegitimate
on grounds of bias or exclusion.
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16586. On language complexity in ballot summaries, see
Shauna Reilley & Sean Richey, Ballot Question Readability and Roll-Off" The Impact of Language
Complexity, 64 POL. RES. Q. 59 (2009).
133. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 148.
134. See, for example, the influential "deliberative polling" exercises conducted by Jim Fishkin
and his collaborators. CENTER FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, http://cdd.stanford.edu (last visited
Nov. 29, 2011).
135. See California Proposition 11, Creation of the California Citizens Redistricting
Commission, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/CalifomiaProposition-I 1,_
Creation-of the California Citizens RedistrictingCommission_(2008) (last visited, Nov. 29, 2011).
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The simplest, most even-handed, and most legitimate way of both limiting
the universe of policy options for a citizen body 136 and of divvying up interest-
group access is to give the major parties the central role and to allow them
"equal time" 137 to perform agenda-setting. In the initial presentation of the
party's "case" to the citizen body, each party, as a coalition of interests, can
decide for itself who should be able to speak, about what, and for how long.
Some interests are sure to be unhappy with the outcome, but there will be no
one to blame but the party with which they are affiliated. Further, given the
powerful place of parties in most citizens' political self-understanding, a
deliberative process that gives equal weight and respect to the citizen's party is
one that the citizen is likely to regard as legitimate. Parties, not academic
grandees, are therefore best positioned to legitimize the deliberative process.
Once the parties accept the mantle of co-equal orchestrator of the deliberative
process, their ability to discredit the outcome after the fact will be much
reduced. Party leaders can reject the outcome, of course, but this will be less
powerful than a rejection coupled with an indictment of the process itself.
In summary, popular democracy could be used to strengthen party
democracy by clarifying what the parties stand for and who is responsible for a
particular legislative action. This may be achieved by substituting referendums
for supermajority-vote requirements and by authorizing the major-party
caucuses in the legislature to put their top legislative priorities to a referendum
vote. Parties could be used to strengthen mass popular democracy by educating
voters who would otherwise be in the dark about the likely merits of pending
ballot initiatives (i.e., with ballot-printed party endorsements). 138 And parties
could strengthen the deliberative, microcosmic version of popular democracy
by assuming primary responsibility for the initial option-winnowing, agenda-
setting, and information-provision needs of the citizen body.
Obviously these are only suggestions. They do not exhaust the potential
complementarities between party and popular democracy, and they do not
prove that the complementarities outweigh the disadvantages of familiar
"mixed" systems (e.g., the accountability occlusion that may result from
extensive use of the ballot initiative). But hybrid democracy is here to stay in
many of the American states, 139 and we might as well learn to make the best of
136. For purposes of this discussion, we assume that the enactment convening the citizen body
to some extent limits the policy options open to the body, but leaves open a sufficiently large number
of options for further winnowing to be necessary. Obviously the more the enactment focuses and limits
the body, the simpler will be the body's agenda-setting problem. But for any number of reasons, both
sincere and strategic, good-government reformers may not wish to strictly enumerate and limit ex ante
the options that the body may consider. Cf infra text accompanying notes 171-173 (discussing
proposal for a "limited" constitutional convention for California).
137. Or time in proportion to their respective vote shares in recent jurisdiction-wide elections.
138. These endorsements would also help to better define the parties in the eyes of those voters
who know something about the substance of the initiatives.
139. See supranote 55.
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it with a set of principles for sound institutional design. This paper is one small
step in that direction.
Our understanding of the conventional narrative of opposition between
party and popular democracy and our thinking about potential complemen-
tarities that are too often overlooked because of the conflict between party
democrats and popular democrats took root during two policy conversations in
which we were fortunate to be involved. The remaining sections of this Article
explore applications of complementarity in real life reform proposals and show
that the problems with which this Article has been concerned are not just of
academic interest, but rather have a large and immediate bearing on governance
and constitutional reform in California and elsewhere. Our complementarity
perspective offers a way of moving beyond the stale debate over whether
popular or party democracy is "good" or "bad," or "better" or "worse" than its
sibling democratic modality.
B. Using Popular Democracy to Break Budget Stalemates
The start of fiscal year 2010 was a particularly challenging time in state
legislatures. Revenues were declining precipitously because of the economic
recession, and nine states began their fiscal years without spending plans in
place. Failing to agree on a budget (again a problem in California, Minnesota,
New York, and Pennsylvania for the start of fiscal year 2011),140 however, is
not just traceable to tough economic times. Since 2002, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have failed, at least
once, to close the deal on a budget on time. Government shutdowns resulted on
six occasions, and California, a routine and repeat offender, has been reduced
to issuing IOUs to its creditors in place of hard currency.
141
The costs of late budgets are enormous: lost wages for state employees,
increased operational costs for extended legislative sessions, legal costs dealing
with frustrated creditors, credit rating ramifications, increased debt costs, lost
revenues due to office closures and furloughs, and tremendous loss of public
confidence, a commodity that is hard to price but impacts every aspect of state
government. 1
42
140. The National Conference of State Legislatures tracks state budget timeliness and its
website has a committed section for budget and tax issues that is tremendously informative about
every state's policies and practices. See Issues and Research, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TablD=756 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
141. Elmendorf & Leib, supra note 14. We drew our data from Late State Budgets, NAT'L
CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17823.
142. See id; MARC J. HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS: DECLINING POLITICAL TRUST
AND THE DEMISE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (2006).
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Divided government can frustrate budget negotiations, especially in
states with highly polarized parties. Negotiations can be trickier yet in states
with direct democracy, as citizens over the years have deployed the ballot
initiative to protect then-favored programs, curtailing legislators' freedom to
make fiscal tradeoffs.143 Add to that the constitutional rules in many states
requiring supermajoritarian agreement for budgets and/or revenue measures:
two states virtually always require annual supermajority votes on budgets, 144
six others require supermajoritarian agreement under certain conditions,14 5 and
sixteen subject tax measures to supermajority requirements. 46 The potent mix
of polarization, ballot-box budgeting, constitutionally driven supermajority
vote requirements, and the veto power of the governor under conditions of
divided government, results in treacherous budget negotiations with real costs
on the polity.
A traditional party man would say that the obvious solution is to do away
with the ballot initiative, eliminate supermajority requirements for budgets and
revenue measures, remove the fiscal set-asides from state constitutions, and let
the majority party govern. But that option is infeasible. Voters like the ballot
initiative and distrust their elected lawmakers. Measures that empower the
party in government at the expense of "the people" are hard sells, and there is
no guarantee that party-empowering reforms would, by themselves, restore
robust two-party competition.1 47 A quick look at California reveals the depth of
these very difficult problems. 148
In 2010, California reformers did manage to terminate by ballot initiative
the state's supermajority requirement for passing budgets-but only by
packaging that reform with a populist measure to dock legislators' pay for
every day that the budget is late. And, pointedly, the initiative did not eliminate
the supermajority requirement for revenue measures. Indeed, at the very same
election, Californians passed two other initiatives that further tightened the
noose on the revenue side.
1 49
143. Although much is made of this obstacle to budget agreement by partisans and the mass
media (and some scholars), some political scientists have challenged the conventional wisdom. See
Matsusaka, supra note 114.
144. The two states are Arkansas and Rhode Island. See Supermajority Vote Requirements to
Pass the Budget: A Legisbrief NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 2008), http://wwwncsl.org/
Default.aspx?Tabld=12654. California was on this list until November 2010, when voters did away
with the supermajority requirement for budget agreement in Proposition 25. For fiscal year 2011,
California's budget was one hundred days late; it passed on October 8, 2010. The tardy budget ended
up helping those who wanted to undo the supermajority requirement.
145. The states are Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, and Nebraska. Id.
146. Waisanen, supra note 112.
147. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 5, at 35-51 (examining barriers to effective
partisan competition at subnational levels of federal systems).
148. Both houses of the California legislature have been controlled by Democrats since 1996.
Table 411--Composition of State Legislatures, by Party Affiliation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/201 l/tables/1 Is041 l.xls (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
149. These were Proposition 26, which expanded the reach of the supermajority requirement
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The distrust of government which underwrote these measures is perhaps
not surprising, given how difficult California's voters have made it for their
elected officials to govern, given the rhetorical battering that "political
insiders" take in ballot initiative campaigns, and given the partisan polarization
of California's legislature.'
1 50
The problem of polarization merits further remark, as it relates in
interesting ways to the institutional questions at the heart of this Article.
California has the most polarized state legislature in the nation.' The median
Democratic representative is far to the left of the state's median voter-who is
quite liberal relative to the national median voter152-and the median
Republican legislator even farther to the right. The extreme polarization of
California's legislature is a predictable outgrowth of California's supermajority
requirement for the passage of revenue bills and the bipartisan gerrymander of
its legislative districts. 153 Because of the gerrymander, a huge swing in public
opinion would be necessary for the minority party (the Republicans) to gain a
significant number of seats. 54 And the supermajority requirement for revenue
for revenue measures, and Proposition 22, which prevented the legislature from allocating certain
revenue streams designated for the use of local governments. See California Statewide General
Election Voter Guide, Proposition 26, CAL. SECRETARY STATE, http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/
propositions/26 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011); California Statewide General Election Voter Guide,
Proposition 22, CAL. SECRETARY STATE http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/22 (last
visited Nov. 29, 2011). One of us has argued that the enactment of Proposition 26 may have been due
to voter confusion, but the confusion concerned a subtle modification to the existing supermajority
requirement for taxes, not the primary purpose of Proposition 26, which was to extend the
supermajority requirement to most "fees" as well as taxes. See Chris Elmendorf, Voter Confusion and
the Single-Subject Rule: Prop. 26 as a Test-Case-in-Waiting, Part One in a Two-Part Series,
FiNDLAw (Dec. 16, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentaiy/20101216_elmendorf.html.
150. For a brief review of the literature on the effects of initiative use on trust in government
and citizens' sense of political efficacy, see Christopher S. Elmendorf, Empirical Legitimacy and
Election Law, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING
PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 117, 134-35 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011).
151. Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legislatures and Individuals in a
Common Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro and Micro Levels 26 fig. 11 (Jan.
20, 2011) (working paper), available at http://ssm.conabstract=-l 697352.
152. Id
153. On the gerrymandering of California's legislature, see DOUGLAS JOHNSON, ROSE INST.
STATE & LOCAL Gov'T, COMPETrIVE DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA: A CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S
REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S (2005), available at http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/rose/
publications/pdf/rose ca case study.pdf (comparing the competitiveness of California's districts in
the past with the 2004 election, where no districts changed hands). In 2008, California, by ballot
initiative, delegated responsibility for drawing electoral districts to an independent commission of lay
citizens. If the commission's initial maps following the 2010 census are any indication, this reform will
result in more competitive districts even though "competition" was not among the dejure criteria that
the commission is charged with pursuing. Eric McGhee, Redistricting Commission Map Looks More
Competitive, S.F. CHRON., June 19, 2011, available at http://www.ppic.org/mainl
commentary.asp?i= 1126. For some recent and diverse reflections and evaluations of the redistricting
commission, see How Will Redistricting Affect Constituents?, ZOCALO PUB. SQUARE,
http://zocalopublicsquare.org/thepublicsquare/2011/06/14/how-will-redistricting-affect-constituents/
read/chats (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
154. Most (but not all) recent empirical work on gerrymandering and polarization finds that
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bills greatly diminishes the Republicans' incentive to develop a moderate state-
party brand, one with appeal to the state's median voter. So long as the
Republicans hold more than one-third of the seats in the legislature,155 they can
block the tax increases their core constituencies so detest. The bottom line is
that the California Republican Party has had little to gain from pivoting to the
middle, which in turn means that Democratic lawmakers can careen off to the
left without jeopardizing their legislative majority. And so it is that California
ends up with the most polarized legislative caucuses in the nation.
Yet, as usefully illustrative as California is in its extremity, the problems
in California are by no means unique.! 56 When each party takes an extreme and
opposite position, far from that of the median voter, how can the median voter
keep policy from shifting too far in one direction? Her tools of control include
separated powers,157 supermajority-decision rules,158 and the ballot initiative.15 9
Conventional advocates for party democracy surely like none of this, for these
practices and requirements occlude accountability.
Observe the paradox: Failures of the party system-namely extreme
polarization and an uncompetitive opposition party--create pressure for
external checks on party-based governance. But these checks make it hard for
the party system to right itself, because they occlude accountability even as
they slow the majority party's efforts to fully implement an agenda that
disregards the median voter. These problems of governance (in California and
elsewhere) circa 2010 call out for the type of party-enhancing alternative check
suggested above-that is, substitution of a popular-approval mechanism for
conventional supermajority-vote requirements.
Writing in the New York Times and the San Francisco Chronicle, we
urged California and other states facing budget stalemates to use ordinary
citizens to break deadlocks. We sketched two models, one relying on a small
deliberative body of lay citizens chosen at random and the other on the mass
referendum.
gerrymandering is not to blame. However, this work does not consider effects of gerrymandering on
party-level strategy and, by extension, on how a "typical" Democrat or Republican legislator would
represent a district with a given distribution of voters. For citations and further discussion, see
Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Districting for a Low Information Electorate, 121
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
155. Which they have been able to do in the current gerrymandered environment.
156. See generally Pildes, supra note 93.
157. Cf Joseph Bafumi etal., Balancing, Generic Polls and Midterm Congressional Elections,
72 J. POL. 705 (2010) (showing that strategic voting by ideological moderates explained mid-term
"swing" away from the President's party in congressional elections). At the state level, the relatively
rich informational environment of gubernatorial elections means that minority-party candidates can
sometimes win the race for governor-overcoming the negative associations of their party brand-
even if their party has no realistic chance of winning a majority of the seats in the legislature. See
Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 5, at 56.
158. When the supermajority vote requirement exceeds the majority party's share of legislative
seats, the majority party will have to compromise with the minority party to pass bills.
159. Which, in principle, enables the median voter to end-run an unresponsive legislature.
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The first model would keep the basic supermajority requirement for
revenue measures in place, but augment it with a fallback procedure in the
event the legislature fails to adopt a balanced budget on time (most likely due
to a partisan impasse). 16 A group of randomly selected citizens-at least one
from each legislative district-would be convened to resolve the stalemate.
Prior to the meeting of this body, two proposed budget/tax packages would be
produced, one by the Democratic caucus in the legislative branch and one by
the Republican caucus. 16 1 The proposed budgets would be finalized prior to the
random citizen selection process, to ensure their tailoring to the projected
preferences of the median voter rather than to those of any specific person
randomly chosen for the citizen budget assembly.
Over a two-week period, the budget assembly of lay citizens would hear
from and question government leaders, policy experts, interest groups, and
other supporters and critics of the proposed budgets, but the agenda, order of
presentations, and witnesses would be in the hands of those proposing the
budgets, mimicking an adversarial proceeding with zealous advocacy on both
sides. The citizens would then deliberate among themselves and vote by secret
ballot on which of the budgets to adopt. The vote would take place on the
budgets as originally submitted; neither the citizens nor lawmakers would be
160. This short sketch draws liberally from our first op-ed on the subject. See Elmendorf &
Leib, supra note 14.
161. In our earlier version of this proposal, we included the governor as one of the relevant
entities that would draw up a proposed budget for the citizen budget assembly to consider. In the
refined proposal here, we simplify the citizens' choices even more, giving them only two budget
packages to consider. In part, we think the sheer peculiarity (from a partisan standpoint) of the
governor in office in California during the last two failed budget negotiations made us think that third
choice was necessary. Schwarzenegger came to power without having to go through a primary process
in the Republican Party, so his ties to the Republican base are thinner than we would expect for any
future governor that comes to power the traditional way. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral
Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415 (2004).
Whether changes in California's primary system will affect the types of people who fill that office-
and whether it will have any long-term effect on party unity, sufficient to make it necessary to add the
governor's proposed budget for the assembly's consideration-is anyone's guess.
We also concede that there is additional-and not obviously necessary-complexity when
citizens have to choose among three budgets that we avoid if we keep it to two: With three options,
there is a difficulty in aggregating assembly members' votes so as to make sure the most preferred
budget prevails and the most disfavored budget fails. Since it is, of course, possible that none of the
three budgets would win a clear majority if each citizen voter were given only a single vote to cast,
voting design must be considered carefully. This is not the place to work through the details but it
suffices to note that these kinds of decisions with more than two options do get made routinely (with
"instant runoff voting"). We suspect that a version of the Coombs Rule, under which the option with
the most "last place" votes is eliminated first, would work pretty well for adjudicating between three
budgets. Cf Bernard Grofinan & Scott L. Feld, If You Like the Alternative Vote (a.ka. the Instant
Runoffi, Then You Ought to Know About the Coombs Rule, 23 ELECTORAL STUD. 641 (2004)
(demonstrating advantages of Coombs Rule for selecting Condorcet winner). Thanks to Mike Gilbert
for forcing us to think this through. For a new book exploring all the complications within democratic
voting systems, see GEORGE G. SzPIRO, NUMBERS RULE: THE VEXiNG MATHEMATICS OF
DEMOCRACY, FROM PLATO TO THE PRESENT (2010).
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able to make amendments.' 62 The winning budget-including its revenue
measures, if any-would become law.
Lay citizen decision making is generally reliable when citizens, serving
like jurors, adjudicate among a small number of discrete choices.163 Americans
are reasonably comfortable with lay citizens making such choices-as
evidenced by the popularity of both the jury and direct democracy, where
ordinary citizens answer "yes" or "no" to exogenously formulated questions.
Accordingly, using citizen assemblies in this way ought to be inoffensive to our
political culture as long as the citizens are not building the budget from the
bottom up. 164
There is also a second option.' 65 The state constitution could be amended
so that, during budget negotiations, either major-party legislative caucus could
declare an impasse that would trigger a referendum vote, in which all citizens
in an act of mass democracy get to vote for a budget. The referendum ballot
would contain two budgets--one from each major party-and the budget
receiving the greater number of votes would become law.
We do not have strong preferences as between the mass and deliberative
mechanisms for breaking budget stalemates. The deliberative approach might do
more to encourage the parties to wrestle with long-term and technically complex
issues and to propose actuarially honest budgets as opposed to budgets that
162. This, again, is to prevent the budget from being "tailored" to the idiosyncratic and
personal concerns of the particular citizens chosen by lot to serve on the budget assembly. It would
also allow the process to be concluded quickly.
163. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE HANs, AMERICAN JuRIEs 340 (2007) ("[I]n systematic studies
spanning five decades, we find that judges agree with jury verdicts in most cases.... In both civil and
criminal trials, the disagreement is not related to the complexity of the trial evidence, as would be
expected if juries misunderstood law and evidence that in contrast legal experts correctly
comprehended."). For an excellent collection of articles about citizen competence in the more general
context of designing participatory democratic institutions, see CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND
DEMOCRATIc INsTrrUTIONs 147 (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward eds., 1999).
164. The mechanics of the bottom-up participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre are described in
detail in GRET & SINTOMER, supra note 15, at 26-61. It is worth mentioning that although Porto
Alegre's experiment with participatory budgeting seems more "popularly" driven than our more party-
respectful version, that is not the only way to look at it. Notably, participatory budgeting in Porto
Alegre is not actually legalized and citizens cannot themselves enact law. Id. at 59. The first exercise
of participatory budgeting had no effect on spending either. Id. at 53. Our citizen budget assembly
would not suffer from these flaws, as it would find its source in the law and have the power to enact
policy. Moreover, the drive to "legalize" the participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre-which has been
in effect since 1989-was inspired in large measure to protect it if the city mayor's office changed
hands to a political party that was less enthusiastic about participatory budgeting. It was after all the
Worker's Party (PT) that put the experiment into effect when it came to power in 1988 and that
supports it through the executive powers that the party has at its disposal. Id. at 59, The resistance to
legalization came from a fear that the law "might subordinate the participatory structure to the
legisla[ture]." Id. Finally, although a superficial look at the mechanics of budgeting in Porto Alegre
shows a strong form of popular democracy, the city council in Porto Alegre actually performs
governmental feasibility studies to check citizen decision making. See id. at 51. Porto Alegre is a good
example of complementarity rather than conflict-and therefore remains an inspiration and a nice
model to learn from.
165. This is the San Francisco Chronicle proposal. Elmendorf& Leib, supra note 14.
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make for good sound bites but are filled with gimmicks.' 66 Yet the deliberative
process is at some risk of being skewed by nonrandom self-selection of invited
participants, 167 by the idiosyncratic views of particular charismatic members, or
even by quid pro quo corruption. It is easier to buy off a handful of citizens than
the hundreds of thousands likely needed to swing a statewide election. Which
process would yield more fiscally responsible and ideologically congruent
outcomes is unclear. For present purposes, however, the commonalities between
the two schemes are more important than the differences.
Each proposal substitutes a popular-approval mechanism for a legislative
supermajority requirement (or, potentially, bicameralism and presentment
requirements). 168 This should help to restore party-based accountability for
critical budgetary decisions. The adopted budget will be either the Democratic
budget or the Republican budget, not some mishmash of compromises which
even the most attentive of voters is unable to untangle for purposes of assigning
party-based responsibility. Down the line, dissatisfied voters would know
exactly whom to reward or to fault when they go to the polls at the next
election. The referendum campaign would also educate voters about the state
parties. This kind of voter education is essential if the parties are to develop
distinct, competitive state-level brands that are responsive to median voter
preferences. Furthermore, the popular approval mechanism should provide
budget proposers with an incentive to take seriously the concerns of the median
voter rather than catering exclusively to their parties' respective bases.
Note also that in the deliberative version of our proposal, the parties play
the critical function of winnowing options, setting the agenda, and providing
information. Parties, of course, cannot be the only ones weighing in: the
nonpartisan Legislative Analyst's office should be allotted some time before
the assembly. This would be a natural extension of the mass-democracy
convention in which the state prepares and distributes a "voter guide" that
includes the Legislative Analyst's characterization of ballot measures and their
likely fiscal impact. But the parties' strengths as agenda setters, integrators of
166. Moreover, the citizens' budget assembly has the ability not only to break a deadlock but
also to furmish useful advice to parties and citizens in the future. Participants in these fora are likely to
be interviewed and questioned about what their elected representatives brought forward as options-
and their collective deliberative judgment and reports should enjoy -a wide audience, allowing
thoughtful popular opinion to improve budget choices going forward.
167. See Amy Lang, Agenda-Setting in Deliberative Forums: Expert Influence and Citizen
Autonomy in the British Columbia Citizens' Assembly, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:
THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIzENs' ASSEMBLY 85 (Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse eds., 2008); Fred
Cutler et al., Deliberation, Information, and Trust: The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly as
Agenda-Setter, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZENS'
ASSEMBLY, supra at 166.
168. We were primarily concerned with California governance when we wrote our proposals,
but the same mechanisms could be used to break budget stalemates that result from divided
government, where each party controls one house of the legislature, or where one party controls the
legislative branch and the other party has the governor's office.
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interest groups, and policy experts can usefully infuse popular democracy with
relevant background for its exercise of common sense. Thus popular democrats
can still have a new exciting institution that allows citizen votes to affect law in
an unmediated fashion after real deliberation, while party democrats can shape
those votes with their better knowledge and expertise.
Our proposals leave many details unexplored. How can a "germaneness to
the budget" requirement be enforced, since so much substantive law gets
passed in budget bills? Should the assembly be allowed to consider structural
reform for the budget process itself? What about measures to alleviate budget
crunches in future years? Who shall adjudicate legal challenges to the
proposals? When and how quickly? Even with these questions unanswered,
however, there is sufficient meat on the bones here to serve as an exemplar of
the way we hope to see popular and party democracy designed in the future:
with an eye toward complementarity.
C. Using Parties to Advise, Rather than Control,
Statewide Constitutional Conventions
We argue above that a better integration of popular and party democracy
could help states resolve everyday policy conflicts, such as how to pass
budgets, but what happens when states undertake broader and more sweeping
efforts to restructure their government? Here, too, there are significant benefits
to viewing popular democracy and party democracy as complementary
helpmates and significant peril to viewing them as adversaries.
Shortly after we ran a version of our proposal to improve state budgeting
processes in the New York Times, 169 we received a phone call to join policy and
legal teams that were organized by Repair California, a coalition of groups that
intended to run an initiative campaign to trigger a constitutional convention in
California. 170 We signed on to help them think about how to design the
169. Elmendorf& Leib, supra note 13.
170. What follows draws from speeches we gave in the fall of 2009. Leib gave a talk at Yale
Law School on the subject as part of The Constitution in 2020 project. See Ethan J. Leib, Localism and
Democracy: The Constitution in 2020 (Oct. 3, 2009), recording available at
http://www.constitution2020.org/node/107. Elrnendorf spoke with Pam Karlan in Sacramento on a
panel sponsored by the Institute for Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley;
the Bill Lane Center for the American West at Stanford; and the Center for California Studies at
California State University, Sacramento. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Comparing Avenues to
Reform: Initiatives, Revision Commission, or Convention? (Oct. 14, 2009), recording available at
http://www.calchannel.com/channel/viewvideo/772.
The following sources contain all the facts that follow: STATE CONSTrUTONS FOR THE
TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY (G. Alan Tarr et al. eds., 2006); Richard Briffault, Electing Delegates to a
State Constitutional Convention: Some Legal and Policy Issues, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1125 (2005); G.
Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Getting from Here to There: Twenty-first Century Mechanisms and
Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075 (2005); Robert F. Williams,
Should the Oregon Constitution Be Revised, and If So, How Should It Be Accomplished?, 87 OR. L.
REV. 867 (2008); and a very useful set of background papers on Alan Tarr's website, Constitutional
Conventions Q&A, CENTER FOR STATE CONST. STUD., http://www-camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/
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proposed convention. Our dialogues with the policy advisory committee helped
us to see just how badly interactions between supporters of each system can be
when those systems are posed as conflictual rather than complementary.
Repair California was committed to the idea of a limited constitutional
convention. 171 It feared, quite reasonably, that contentious social issues like gay
marriage or the death penalty would bog down or fracture the convention 172 and
that the California electorate would be reluctant to authorize a constitutional
revision process that could result in the undoing of California's legendary
property tax limitations. On the other hand, Repair California did not want to
prejudge which potential structural reforms to California's government should
be on or off the table. Thus, Repair California proposed to limit the convention
to four general topic areas: elections, governance, budget-related constitutional
provisions, and fiscal management between the state and localities (with
Proposition 13 specifically excluded). 173
The question of how to circumscribe, if at all, the work of a convention
cannot be answered well without knowing more about how convention
delegates will be selected. The more sophisticated the delegates and the more
legislative experience they have, the better their odds of coping with an open-
ended task. From the outset, Repair California hoped to engineer a novel "lay
citizens" model for delegate selection.1 74 All previous state constitutional
conventions had been populated by election or appointment, but Repair
California wanted to select delegates at random from the full pool of eligible
California voters.
Popular democrats on the policy advisory committee embraced this model
with vigor. True to form, they wanted to exclude any and all participation by
political parties. In their view, parties and party insiders were to blame for the
conconvqa.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). Much of what we are sharing here is also the product of
many phone calls in which we participated in. connection with our work on the advisory boards to
Repair California and the voluminous email correspondence with that group as well.
171. The legality of limited conventions is explored in Robert F. Williams & G. Alan Tarr, The
Law of Limited State Constitutional Conventions, Ctr. for State Constitutional Studies (N.J. Const.
Reform Background Paper #7) (undated), available at http://camlaw.mtgers.edu/statecon/
njtaxconvpapers/report7.pdf. Alaska's constitution does not allow limited conventions; and Montana's
requires popularly-initiated conventions to be unlimited. ALASKA CONST. art. XIII § 4; MONT. CONST.
at. XV § 2(1).
172. Concerns about "runaway" conventions drive much of the thinking about triggering them.
See Gerald Benjamin & Tom Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP.
53 (1996). Even the New York Times cannot repress its fear. See Editorial, The New York Convention
Con, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A18. To be fair, New York's proposed convention would be a
product only of parties with very little popular participation, a design that has proven itself not to work
well, for reasons we discuss in what follows.
173. This was similar to a strategy New York used in preparation for a failed call for a
convention in 1997: New York proposed four "Action Panels" within their convention delegation to
address the four policy areas that were of especial interest: fiscal integrity, state/local relations,
education, and public safety. See Williams, supra note 170, at 894.
174. See Steven Hill, The Big Constitutional Convention Question: Who's Going To Fix
California, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/un/22/opinion/oe-hi1I22.
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current dysfunction of California politics, and only the common sense of the
man in the streets could fix this mess. 175 However, some preliminary internal
polling suggested that the convention call would likely fail if the initiative
specified "random" selection.
At least two other models (and hybrids thereof) for choosing delegates
were under serious consideration. One was selection by election, a fairly
common mechanism in the history of state constitutional conventions with
certain legal advantages. 176 Though "scientific" selection polled better, Repair
California took the idea of electing delegates quite seriously. Members of the
policy committee that we would tend to identify as party democrats also
favored elections, and, true to form, they were deeply skeptical of citizens
acting directly in the political sphere, citing standard deficiencies with citizen
competence. The sense that party democracy and popular democracy were
oppositional was on full display in these debates, and that oppositional posture
was obstructing the possibility for nuanced design.
The elected-delegates model was ultimately rejected, however, for reasons
of cost, timing, and anxiety that the same interests that dominate elections to
the California Senate and Assembly would end up controlling the convention.
This led to a discussion of selection by appointment. Florida has used an
appointed constitutional revision commission since the adoption of its 1968
constitution,' 77 and some viewed the appointment model as a way of ensuring
expertise and diversity.' 78 Party democrats also tended to favor appointed
delegations for the convention (when they saw that an elected delegation was a
non-starter) because it seemed clear that most appointments would be political
175. Practical problems quickly emerged during the months that the popular democrats were
prevailing upon Repair California to embrace a fully random model. How large a delegation is needed
to get a representative sample? Is five hundred people (the benchmark number we were using) simply
too large to allow for good deliberation? Should noncitizens participate and vote? If DMV lists are
used to draw randomly from the population, might the convention not systematically lose people and
diversity? Using voter rolls surely would undercount minorities.
176. Along with designing a new substantive model for constitutional conventions, Repair
California also wanted to change the trigger for calling a constitutional convention in California-
specifically, to enable a convention to be called by ballot initiative in lieu of the two-thirds vote of the
legislature that the California Constitution currently requires. CAL. CONST. art. 18 § 1. There is a
chance that an initiated constitutional amendment that enables a convention to be called by ballot
initiative would be characterized by the courts as a constitutional "revision" rather than an
"amendment," owing to the qualitative significance of the change it effects. Under well-established
California law, constitutional revisions cannot be enacted by ballot initiative. See Strauss v. Horton, 46
Cal. 4th 364 (2009). Several members of the legal team thought that a revision-based challenge to a
ballot measure allowing a convention to be called by ballot would be marginally weaker if the "change
in the call" initiative did not also authorize new methods of delegate selection.
177. For a discussion of Florida's experience with constitutional revision, see Rebecca Mae
Salokar, Constitutional Revision in Florida: Planning, Politics, Policy, and Publicity, in 1 STATE
CONSTTrUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 170, at 19-57; and Williams, supra
note 170, at 891-93.
178. These views were expressed in the conversations cited supra note 170.
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in some form or other, as they are in Florida. 179 But popular democrats were
disappointed by the appointments model: How could the new constitution
really be the voice of the people if the people never got to participate directly in
deliberating about its design? Popular democrats were not mollified by the fact
that any proposals on which the delegation agreed needed the voters' approval
to take effect as California's new constitution. The ratification stage is very
different from the design stage.
With the clash between party democrats and popular democrats came
efforts to bridge the gap, a need we recognized in our design project about the
budget as well. Although random selection was the method preferred by most
committee members, there was a lot of discussion about how to temper some of
the feared pathologies of this approach (such as technical or political naYvetd
and lack of proper representation due to self-selection effects). We considered
hybrid delegations-with some members elected, some appointed, and some
randomly selected-but hybrids can carry the drawback that delegates will not
be deliberating equally. Even if each delegate has one vote, natural deliberation
dynamics will tend to have the "lay" delegation deferring to the others.
180
Accordingly, we favored a design that would allow both sides to win victories
without having to undermine the other.
Our effort at conciliation between the popular and party democrats led to a
proposal to choose the delegates at random from the populace but to structure
the convention proceedings using an Advisory Commission whose membership
would be split between neutral experts (selected by the nonpartisan and highly
respected Legislative Analyst) and partisan appointees. The latter would be
chosen, in equal numbers, by a Democratic Appointments Committee and a
Republican Appointments Committee. These committees would in turn be
drawn from the ranks of the respective parties' top elected officials, both
current and former.'
8
'
The Advisory Commission would be charged with winnowing the
universe of potential constitutional reforms down to a handful of leading
contenders for the convention delegates to consider; assembling a briefing
packet of background materials on these options for the delegates; preparing a
list of witnesses who would testify, pro and con, on each of the proposed
reforms; and, finally, with explaining to the delegates how the leading
contenders were selected. The delegates would remain free to consider other
reforms, to invite other witnesses, and, of course, to ignore the Advisory
Commission's recommendations.
179. Representatives from minority communities that were on Repair California's policy
committee also favored appointment. They suggested that an appointment method was more likely to
produce a diverse delegation.
180. See Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347 (1997).
181. Cf Elmendorf, supra note 34, at 1409-10 (presenting similar model for appointments to
election reform bodies).
[Vol. 100:69
HeinOnline  -- 100 Cal. L. Rev. 110 2012
THE PARTIES AND THE PEOPLE
The reasons for involving the Commission at the outset should be
apparent: to keep the scope of the lay delegates' task manageable; to ground the
delegates' work in political reality as it is understood by the people who have
actually tried to govern subject to the constraints of the California Constitution;
to forewarn the delegates about the politics of actually trying to enact the kinds
of reforms that the delegates might favor; to reduce the likelihood of the
convention ending up under the de facto control of some random internal
faction comprised of delegates who just happen to be a bit more knowledgeable
and charismatic than the others; and to resolve conflicts among interest groups
and other outside parties over who is "owed" time-and how much-to make
the case for their preferred reforms before the convention. The Advisory
Commission would have no votes at the convention but would have some
discursive influence and provide real guidance for lay citizens, who are not
necessarily accustomed to debating constitutional design.
The role of the Advisory Commission under our state constitutional
reform proposal is not unlike the role for the major parties' legislative
leadership under our proposal for breaking budget stalemates. Yet, the reader
will observe that we did not recommend delegating agenda-setting for
constitutional reform to the major parties' current legislative leadership, in
hopes of inducing the development of competing Democratic and Republican
proposals from which the delegates would choose. Rather, the Advisory
Commission was to consist of equal numbers of partisan and nonpartisan
members, and the partisan members were to be chosen by current and former
top elected officials.
Why these differences between constitutional convention design and
budget process design? They owe to the different goals to be realized in
constitution making and budget making. Constitutions, at their best, serve to
legitimate and to limit the political order over the long run. Their design ought
to embody a correspondingly long-term perspective. The practical wisdom of
top government officials who have tried to govern under the constitution that is
to be reformed is indisputably germane to this project, but the long-term
perspective is more likely to be realized if the parties' contributions come not
just from current leadership, but from former officials as well. 182
The Advisory Commission was also designed to filter the parties'
contributions through a process that requires engagement and compromise with
the opposing party as well as nonpartisan experts. It would be little short of
disastrous for a constitutional convention to devolve into a choice between two
starkly different reform packages, one pushed by and designed to entrench the
current Democratic Party leadership or agenda, the other crafted by the
Republican leadership to similar effect. The resulting constitution almost
182. Forner officials, particularly those no longer serving in government, are also less likely to
benefit personally from any constitutional reforms the convention might propose.
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certainly would not be regarded as legitimate by minority-party identifiers (and
it might hamper the minority's efforts to regain power for years to come). The
fact that the constitution would take effect only after being approved by the
median convention delegate and then the median voter would be beside the
point. If citizens who affiliate with the minority party generally regard the
constitution as a bald power play, the constitution cannot perform its
legitimating function.
By contrast, there is nothing objectionable about a stark clash between a
pair of budgets crafted by the Democratic and Republican parties' current
legislative leaders. If the Republican budget loses-a likely result in California
today-that is merely a signal that California Republicans need to stake out
different positions to become competitive as a state party. And, critically, their
budget loss is just a one-year loss. There will be another budget to adopt next
year-another chance for the minority party to show that it now deserves the
median voter's support. Our budget-tiebreaker procedure will have performed
its role if it yields an on-time budget and in the process clarifies for ordinary
citizens what each of the major state parties stands for at that time.
The point of a constitutional convention, however, is not to "get the job
done quickly" or to educate voters about the parties. The point is to craft a
technically sound and politically saleable package of constitutional reforms
that, if adopted, supports legitimate and responsive governance for many years
to come. The parties' participation can help to ground and legitimate the
convention's work, but no party should expect to "have its way" on
constitutional reform, even it can persuade a majority of the convention
delegates to side with it.
Ultimately, neither our Advisory Commission proposal nor the Repair
California constitutional convention took flight. The principals at Repair
California opted for a hybrid model in which some delegates would be chosen
at random from the citizenry and others would be appointed by formally
nonpartisan local government officials, whom the voters think better of than
"politicians in Sacramento." 183 Agenda setting was not addressed. The entire
undertaking then went south because Repair California was unable to raise the
money to qualify its plan for the ballot.
As one would expect given the standard party versus popular democracy
narrative, popular democrats on the policy advisory committee hated the
Advisory Commission model. In our view, the popular democrats were insen-
sitive to the reality that parties would have resources at the ratification stage that
could upset all the hard work of the exercise of popular democracy at the design
stage. 184 Popular democrats also unfairly denied the good faith and practical
183. For the details of their hybrid, see Repair Cal., Delegate Selection (inoperative web page
last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (archive copy on file with the author).
184. Consider British Columbia's deliberative Citizens' Assembly, which spent a year deciding
that the province's election system should move to "single transferable vote" to better reflect the
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wisdom of elected party leaders who had actually tried to govern California, as
if anyone who had tried to work within the major-party system was forever
tainted for their efforts. Party democrats, for their part, may have been too quick
to discount the potential credibility and party-disciplining benefits of drawing
convention delegates directly from the people at large. This selection technique
would seem particularly appropriate for bodies that constitute the rules under
which the parties must operate and especially when the parties-in-government
have become unmoored from the median voter's concerns.
Had the convention occurred, it is anyone's guess what it would have
produced. Maybe it would have collapsed, for want of an organized mechanism
for focusing debate and decision. Maybe it would have organized from within,
with the more savvy and politically connected members (probably the local
government appointees) taking charge. What is clear, however, is that the
convention's work would not have been grounded except adventitiously in the
experiences of the state's most high-profile and electorally accountable current
and former leaders or in the practical political smarts of the state parties whose
job it is to organize and make some sense out of the cacophony of citizen
opinion. Once one grasps the role that parties play in orchestrating legislative
action, enabling citizens to fathom their electoral choices, integrating interest
groups into majority or potential-majority coalitions, and in shaping citizens'
sense of what is politically acceptable, it is hard to see why the parties should
be excluded from a forum for constitutional reform, even if they should not be
simply handed the reins.
CONCLUSION
Our experiences with institutional design in both the budget and the
constitutional convention contexts have convinced us that something is very
wrong with posing party democracy and popular democracy as oppositional.
We have taken for granted what popular democracy contributes to the
aspiration for popular sovereignty, a first principle of democracy; but we have
tried to be a bit more specific about why party democracy is so crucial to
democratic functioning in the real world. Ultimately, both modalities of
democracy are part of the same family, and they can help support one another
much better when institutional designers start to see their potential
complementarity. Each has its imperfections, but neither is going anywhere
anytime soon. Those with their eyes on the prize of trying to legitimate and
improve each form of democracy ought to take seriously our complementarity
view as the basis for a reform agenda going forward.
diversity of citizens in the province. The people, in a province-wide referendum, failed to adopt the
Citizens' Assembly proposal. It needed a supermajority of 60 percent and came shy of it with a 57
percent approval vote. It went to a second vote and failed again, garnering only 38 percent approval.
For detail about and analysis of the British Columbian Citizens' Assembly, see DESIGNING
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 167.
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